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THE AUTHOR 
 
Eur. Ing. Professor Gordon R. Wray, FRS, FEng, BSc, MScTech, PhD (Manchester), 
DSc (Loughborough), CEng, FIMechE, CText, FTI, AMCST, FRSA, Hon MIED, was 
appointed Royal Academy of Engineering Professor in the Principles of Engineering Design 
at Loughborough University of Technology from August 1988. This multi-disciplinary 
professorial Chair, the first of its kind, was created through the initiative and support of the 
Royal Academy of Engineering, Britain's national academy of elected and distinguished 
engineers, in recognition of the increasing importance of engineering design as a unifying 
theme across all engineering disciplines. Professor Wray was previously Professor and Head 
of the Department of Mechanical Engineering at Loughborough. 
Professor Wray is also the founding Director of the University's Engineering Design 
Institute, which was established as a centre of excellence for teaching the principles of 
engineering design to undergraduates, postgraduates, practising engineers and school 
teachers. The Institute also conducts interdisciplinary research in design across all sections of 
the university and, wherever possible, with industrial participation. It was recently awarded a 
grant from the Wolfson Foundation for new engineering design research laboratories. 
At the age of 15 Gordon Wray was an engineering apprentice with Lancashire companies 
before becoming an engineering draughtsman. He then studied part-time at Bolton Technical 
College for Ordinary and Higher National Certificates in Mechanical Engineering and 
GIMechE. In 1949, he entered Manchester University as a Sir Walter Preston scholar and 
graduated with BScTech (Hons) to become a development engineer with Platt Brothers 
Limited. He lectured in Mechanical Engineering at Bolton Technical College from 1954 and 
became Lecturer in Textile Engineering at the University of Manchester Institute of Science 
and Technology (UMIST) in 1955, where he gained MScTech and PhD degrees as a member 
of staff. 
Since being appointed as Reader in Mechanical Engineering in 1966 at the then newly-
created Loughborough University of Technology, Dr Wray has been a forerunner at the 
University. In 1970, he was honoured by being the recipient of one of the first personal chairs 
awarded by the University, in recognition of his combined expertise in Mechanical 
Engineering and Textile Technology. In 1978 he became the first engineering staff member 
to graduate as Doctor of Science of the University. 
Professor Wray is an internationally recognised authority on the design of high-speed and 
automatic machinery, being the author of numerous publications, having lectured world-wide 
and administered international projects. He also founded a large team at Loughborough 
concerned with the invention, research, design and development of such machinery, some of 
which has been widely exported. In 1975 he received the James Clayton Prize, the premier 
award of the Institution of Mechanical Engineers for 'outstanding innovation'. This was the 
third time Professor Wray had won an Institution Prize, having been awarded the Viscount 
Weir Prize in 1959 and the Water Arbitration Prize in 1972. 
In 1986 Professor Wray was awarded the great distinction of being elected a Fellow of the 
Royal Society. He was the first member of staff of any ex-CAT University to be elected FRS. 
He had already had the earlier distinction, in 1980, of being the first Loughborough academic 
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to be elected as a Fellow of the Royal Academy of Engineering. He is also a Fellow of the 
Institution of Mechanical Engineers and was a Member of Council of that Institution from 
1965 to 1968. He is a Fellow of the Textile Institute and a Fellow of the Royal Society of 
Arts. He was the first British academic to receive the title European Engineer (Eur. Ing.) at a 
commemorative ceremony in Paris in 1987. In March 1990 he was awarded Honorary 
Membership of the Institution of Engineering Designers, the highest honour that Institution is 
able to bestow. 
In 1976 Professor Wray was invited to give a Nominated Lecture to the Institution of 
Mechanical Engineers and was awarded the premier prize of the Textile Institute — the 
Warner Memorial Medal for 'outstanding published work'. In 1977 he was the nominated 
Springer Memorial Visiting Professor in Mechanical Engineering at the University of 
California, Berkeley. He also received a Certificate for Engineering Merit from the American 
Society of Mechanical Engineers, and was awarded the S.G. Brown Award and Medal by the 
Royal Society of London for his "contribution to the promotion and development of 
mechanical inventions". In 1980, he was invited to deliver the Brunel Lecture to the Annual 
Meeting of the British Association for the Advancement of Science. In December 1989, 
together with Dr M. Acar, he presented the 76th Thomas Hawksley Memorial Lecture on 
"The Supersonic Jet Texturing of Yarns" to the Institution of Mechanical Engineers, London. 
Professor Wray has advised higher education institutions in many countries and has served 
on many national committees and working parties, including a Royal Society Working Party 
on Agricultural Engineering in 1981, the SERC Lickley Working Party on Engineering 
Design in 1983 and as Chairman of an Engineering Council/Design Council Working Party 
on 'Attaining Competences in Engineering Design'. 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
PART I  :  LECTURE BY PROFESSOR WRAY 
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1 The Evolution of the British University System with Particular 
Reference to Science, Engineering and Technology 
Britain's famous Industrial Revolution owed very little to the universities. Its 18th Century 
creators were intensely practical, enterprising men such as Arkwright, Brindley, Cartwright, 
Crompton, Darby, Hargreaves, Kay, MacAdam, Newcomen, Trevithick and Watt. Their 
inventions all culminated in Britain becoming pre-eminent in the design, manufacture and 
transport of world-leading, high-quality capital goods. By the end of the 19th Century, 
however, competition had grown in other world markets and there were signs that Britain's 
lead was diminishing, with the development of mass production techniques, particularly in 
the United States. This lead had been greatly helped by a growing empire, with its captive 
markets and the provision of cheap raw materials, but it was largely due to the acquired 
knowledge of our innovative civil and mechanical engineers, which was related to their craft 
skills rather than to any appreciable understanding of science. They apparently used the laws 
of mathematics and dynamics somewhat intuitively without realising that these actually 
underlied their creative skills. 
Following on these early inventions, almost a century elapsed before the scientific 
knowledge generated in the traditional universities and recorded in learned society journals 
began to influence the future shape of industrial change and innovation. Indeed, although 
many of the pioneers of British industry patronised education, few recognised that it had 
anything to do with the creation of the wealth that was paying for it. At the beginning of this 
century, it was being suggested by some concerned citizens that we should be learning 
lessons from several of our European competitors, particularly the higher technological 
education evident in the German Technische Hochschulen and the French Grandes Ecoles, 
because these were providing professional elite who both recognised and used the underlying 
scientific and engineering skills necessary for improving the development and production of 
all manufactured products. 
Nevertheless, British society generally showed little recognition that higher education was 
essential for our international economic survival although, in Victorian days, the Mechanics 
Institutes had developed a system of technical education, mainly by part-time study. This 
was usually regarded as inferior to university education and was considered to be intended 
mainly for the working classes. It generated the snobbish ill-informed attitude that still 
prevails in the minds of many British citizens today; namely that technology is a type of 
study mainly suitable for the less able. The Victorian engineer was certainly not regarded as 
a professional in the same sense as were the lawyers, medics and clerics of that day; this is a 
status issue which still gives great concern to the major UK engineering professional 
institutes as they seek to recruit better entrants. 
During the early years of the 19th Century, there were only two universities in England, i.e. 
Oxford and Cambridge, and these were concerned with the education of the sons of the 
landowners, who were mainly destined to join the learned professions of law, medicine and 
the church. Therefore, science had little place in their education, and those few College 
Fellows who professed and practised science were not held in high esteem by their 
colleagues. Nevertheless, there were some Britons who recognised that radical educational 
change was necessary at all levels if the British manufacturing lead was not to be completely 
lost to the growing competition of Europe and America. 
English educational reforms led to the creation of the Mechanics Institutes and the Dissenting 
Academies, which usually arose from non-conformist movements to provide for more 
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appropriate educational patterns than those being offered at the two existing English 
universities. The pioneers of these institutes and academies were men who displayed 
independence, since they were often merchants and manufacturers in the growing industrial 
areas. 
By the end of the 19th Century, German exports had exceeded British exports. Germany was 
producing more educated engineers, many of whom were not only employed in engineering 
research and development but were also providing the essential business support services 
such as design and marketing. There was little doubt that the status of the engineer on the 
Continent was high, whilst in Britain it remained very low. This was a condition which 
prevailed at least until the Finniston Report (1) of only 10 years ago; this led to the 
establishment of the Engineering Council, which has made strenuous attempts to rectify this 
typically British anomaly. 
Towards the end of the 19th Century, practical men raised money and appealed for public 
subscriptions for new university colleges in England, but these remained in perilous financial 
straits for many years until they eventually achieved government help. The university 
colleges became the large civic universities, mainly because they merged with local medical 
colleges. It is remarkable that, even though it was the largest city in the world, London had 
no university institution until 1828, when University College was founded. The University of 
Durham, which was established in 1836, was at first modelled very closely on Oxford and 
Cambridge, but in 1871 local industrialists helped to fund the Armstrong College of Science, 
which also provided for education in mining and engineering. Owens' College in 
Manchester, founded in 1851, became the Victoria University (including also the colleges at 
Liverpool and Leeds) in 1889. This federal University became the three separate civic 
universities of Manchester, Liverpool and Leeds in 1903. The Mechanics' Institute in 
Manchester (1824) was in fact older than the Owens' College (1851), but its successor, the 
Manchester College of Technology, became the Faculty of Technology (now UMIST) in the 
Victoria University of Manchester when Owens' College received its charter as a separate 
university in 1903. 
Two well-known British academics, Sir Frederick Dainton (2) and Professor Geoffrey Sims 
(3), have each given detailed accounts of the difficult early years common to the new civic 
universities, since they all underwent a continued struggle for existence until 1920. State 
financial support for them was only on an ad-hoc basis and their principal output comprised 
graduates at the first degree level, most of whom became school teachers. Masters degrees 
by research were offered, usually part-time, and no PhD programmes existed. The state 
provided no scholarships. The only grants available for undergraduates were offered by the 
universities themselves from their scant resources. Fortunately, there were some far-sighted 
politicians who argued that the state should provide student grants or scholarships, as well as 
properly funding the universities to both teach and undertake research. They argued that 
scientific research was necessary for the nation's health, industry and defence. 
The First World War exposed Britain's deficiencies in these fields and Britain's first 
Research Council, the Department of Scientific and Industrial Research (DSIR), was founded 
in 1916, followed soon afterwards by the Medical Research Council (MRC). Thus the 
Research Council system came into being, and in 1919 the University Grants Committee 
(UGC) was established, together with the Committee of Vice-Chancellors and Principals 
(CVCP); the PhD Degree (which probably originated in Germany) also started in Britain at 
this time. Therefore, the immediate post-First World War era marked the beginning of the 
dual-support system of UGC and Research Council funding. 
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The 20-years leading up to the outbreak of the Second World War in 1939 consolidated the 
growth of the civic universities. The pupils from maintained secondary schools gained an 
increasing number of university places, local authorities offered financial help and 200 state 
scholarships were established for the most able students. However, even by then, the total 
university student population in Britain was only 50,000, of which 40% were in the Oxford, 
Cambridge and London universities. Nevertheless, during this intervening period between 
the two World Wars, university research became accepted and the system was strengthened 
by the influx of refugee scientists from Germany and Austria. The Agricultural Research 
Council (ARC) was added to the two existing Research Councils in 1931. The number of 
industrial research associations grew during this 20-year period and government research, 
especially that related to defence, increased. 
During the Second World War, the results of research undertaken by British scientists based 
on knowledge accumulated in the universities were evident in such developments as 
penicillin, radar, operational research and the first computer (known as the 'electronic brain'); 
biological research also yielded increased food production and higher nutritional standards. 
Of course, much of the scientific war-time effort of all the engaged nations was directed 
towards armaments, the most devastating being the atomic bomb that finally concluded the 
war. It was the effects of the war that brought to the British nation a public and political 
consciousness of the intense power of applied science, technology and engineering. 
The post-Second World War period gave public recognition to the lack of qualified scientists 
and engineers, and government awareness of this finally reached its peak in the acceptance of 
the 1963 Robbins Report (4). This recommended that all who were qualified to benefit from 
Higher Education should receive it in the subject of their own choice. Then Prime Minister 
Harold Wilson, in implementing the Robbins Report, spoke about "the white heat of the 
technological revolution" when his government established the Ministry of Technology (now 
the Department of Trade and Industry), decreed that all the Colleges of Advanced 
Technology (of which Loughborough was one) should be redesignated as independent 
university institutions, and funded both the Polytechnics and the Open University. This 
movement, largely towards higher education in engineering and technology, was welcomed 
by those who believed that such studies should be more prestigious in the public eye and 
better catered for by the universities. 
Meanwhile, the industrial situation in which engineers had to operate was itself changing 
from one which was product-led (i.e. the assumption that an excellent product will always 
sell), to one which was market-led (the need to create new markets for innovatory products). 
The engineer, therefore, had to accept the responsibility for producing well-designed 
products which had to be produced at a competitive price whilst being reliable and attractive 
to customers in terms of their performance. 
During this post-war period of rapid university expansion, it was disappointing that UK 
industry generally did very little to encourage either education or training; this was 
increasingly left to the universities themselves. Much adverse criticism was made by 
industrialists about the unworldliness of the universities, and this was often well-founded. 
Similarly, some initially co-operative academics criticised industry for being unable to 
express what it really needed from universities, either in education or research, and this again 
was often true. 
Industry called upon the universities to produce engineers who were cost-conscious with an 
ability to design and manage, but all too often engineering graduates were given little 
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opportunity for career advancement within engineering companies. The demand for 
accountants and managers therefore grew, with attractive financial incentives, and it is 
estimated that currently 10% of all university graduates (20% of Oxford and Cambridge 
graduates) finish up in accountancy and similar financial occupations in commerce and 'the 
city'. 
The number of graduates seeking to pursue management (MBA) courses is growing 
annually, and this is a welcome trend in improving British management standards, but the 
number of undergraduates wishing to study science and engineering is falling. In my opinion, 
it is a great fallacy for Britain to believe that it can continually increase the numbers of those 
involved in the control and management of its decreasing manufactured product base. 
Britain's serious Balance of Payments deficit in manufactured goods, currently standing at 
£16 billion annually, has been partially caused by a shortage of good engineers who can 
create products that can compete against other industrial countries (particularly Germany and 
Japan) where good engineering graduates have been more positively encouraged in salary, 
status and career advancement (5). Moreover, this decline in university science and 
engineering graduates has led to a tremendous problem in providing for good science 
teachers in British schools. 
During the Robbins period of expansion in the late 1960s, a corresponding growth occurred 
in the Research Council system with the creation of both the National Environment Research 
Council (NERC) and the Social Science Research Council (SSRC), which later became the 
Economic and Social Research Council (ESRC); also the DSIR (which had been created in 
1916) was renamed the Science Research Council (SRC), and this eventually became the 
Science and Engineering Research Council (SERC) in 1981. This expansion of national 
research funding further emphasised the importance of the dual support system between the 
Research Councils and the University Grants Committee, but this funding system has been 
questioned and changed by the present government, firstly by moving the responsibility for 
the UGC from the Treasury to the Department of Education and Science (DES), and 
secondly by the more recent decision that the UGC should be replaced by the Universities' 
Funding Council (UFC). 
It was also decided that the Polytechnics and Colleges of Higher Education sector should 
receive a greater share of higher education provision directly from central government, rather 
than through local authorities, by resourcing them through a new body known as the 
Polytechnics and Colleges Funding Council (PCFC). According to the 1987 government 
White Paper, these two funding bodies have been created to "clarify responsibilities, improve 
financial accountability, and increase effectiveness". It was argued that the word 'grant' was 
somewhat outmoded whilst 'funding' was more appropriate to present-day needs. 
The UFC has a larger non-academic membership and intends to allocate funds on a much 
more stringent basis. Therefore, all universities have recently had to undergo a competitive 
bidding process for university student numbers and courses. The indications to-date are that 
the new recommendations, coupled with other cuts in research and teaching expenditure, are 
causing some concern in higher education generally, although the need for greater efficiency 
is well-recognised and is indeed being readily acted upon within the university system. 
Loughborough University of Technology has always been very strong in encouraging 
industrial support for its research (5) and indeed it was placed fifth in the league table of 
industrial funding of all British universities. Nevertheless, the Vice-Chancellor, Professor 
D.E.N. Davies, told the Annual Meeting of the University's Court on 31st January 1990 that 
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those universities which derived research funding from industry and commerce, as opposed 
to the government-funded Research Councils, were being penalised by the policies of the 
new Universities Funding Council. The UFC research evaluation system has been criticised 
by many sources for favouring pure science and penalising those departments which 
undertake applied research for industry. Loughborough University of Technology had 
suffered from this effect and it was particularly notable that those Loughborough 
departments with a high proportion of industrial funding had not scored as highly as those 
which were primarily Research Council funded. The research funding of universities over the 
next five years will be based heavily upon the value of these research ratings. 
The UFC has recently issued a report on its selection exercise, which has confirmed that this 
bias against applied funding is intentional and part of its policy. Extracts from this report 
state: "The focus of the Council's science research funding is towards basic and strategic 
work; for more applied research, universities are expected to seek funding from other 
sources", and "departments with high output of good quality pure science scored more highly 
than departments with a largely applied science bias; this is as it should be". Professor 
Davies stated that it is obviously absurd to expect universities to collaborate with industry on 
research if the UFC persists in labelling this as lower quality work, and he called upon the 
UFC to re-examine this area of its policy. 
 
2 Engineering Qualifications in Britain 
Although the universities were slow to encompass engineering studies (the first Chair of 
Engineering at Cambridge was founded in 1875), the ingenious men who inspired British 
engineering during the 18th Century were widely respected and the Institution of Civil 
Engineers was established in 1818. This laid the firm foundation of professional engineering 
in Britain and was followed by other Institutions, principally the Institution of Mechanical 
Engineers and the Institution of Electrical Engineers. Technical Colleges, founded on the 
basis of the Mechanics' Institutes (Section 1), sprang up throughout the country and these led 
to ONC and HNC qualifications and progressively through to professional chartered 
engineering qualifications based on corporate membership of these Institutions. The latter 
stage was usually attained by part-time study at the Technical College whilst concurrently 
following an engineering career in industry, followed by a period of professional 
responsibility after completing such part-time study. 
Some 20 years ago, the UK professional engineering institutions jointly abolished such part-
time routes to professional qualifications for prestige purposes and decided that every 
chartered engineer should  be a graduate of a university or polytechnic before attaining the 
required training and professional responsibility standards required for chartered and 
registered status. The initial graduate stage was usually based on only three years of full-time 
study for an engineering degree, albeit it after obtaining A-level or equivalent entrance 
qualifications, which are generally higher than those necessary for entrance to the longer 
periods of undergraduate degree study at many other European universities. 
After the Second World War, it became increasingly accepted that, whilst the three-year 
engineering course may have suited British industry during the early part of the 20th 
Century, the impact of rapidly changing technology was demanding substantial specialist 
educational skills. Nevertheless, successive governments avoided extending UK degree 
courses to those comparable with the continental practice, whereby the necessary speciality 
is additional to a sound basic educational engineering requirement. Therefore, for economic 
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reasons, UK undergraduate education remains generally confined to three-year courses 
which have tended to become more specialised at the expense of the more general factors 
which are of fundamental importance in the real world of engineering industry. The only 
concession to this trend was the introduction of four-year extended degree courses 
(sometimes known as 'Dainton' courses) in the 1970s. 
In recent years it has become increasingly necessary to use continuing education so that 
graduates can update their university education, by part-time study, in order to stay abreast of 
the constant stream of new and advanced technology. Integrated Graduate Development 
Schemes (IGDS) are an excellent example of such continuing education at postgraduate 
level, and the new modular MSc course in Engineering Design at Loughborough University 
of Technology, which is offered on either full-time or part-time basis (see Section 19), is 
another example of a flexible approach to continuing education in engineering in association 
with industry. 
A government enquiry into the engineering profession led to the 1980 Finniston Report (1). 
This addressed the problems associated with a longer period of engineering education and 
training than had been considered adequate in the past. 
It also advocated the possibility of transfer between the part-time and full-time routes of 
engineering education so that late developers should still be able to achieve the professional 
status that had been the case in pre-war years. It stipulated that 'Engineering Applications' 
should be compulsory with all engineering degree courses which were accredited through the 
professional institutions for the status and registration of 'Chartered Engineers'. The principal 
recommendation, however, was the establishment of an Engineering Authority, which would 
take over the responsibility for the registration of Chartered Engineers from the professional 
institutions. The Engineering Council was, therefore, set up in November 1981, but so far it 
has largely failed to obtain the resources from government for the encouragement of 
engineering education that both industry and academia had so largely expected after 
publication of the Finniston Report. Nevertheless, the continued flow of policy papers from 
the Engineering Council has been welcome and considerable changes have already taken 
place in universities and polytechnics regarding higher education in engineering, although 
these have occurred against a background of reduced financial resources from central 
government. 
 
3 University Research and Industrial Exploitation (including  
 Specially Promoted Programmes and Teaching    
 Companies) 
It has long been my view that engineering academics should endeavour to harness their 
researches to the needs of the engineering industries (5,6,7). However, immediately after the 
1939-45 war, a considerable amount of money enabled academics to indulge in research 
which they felt to be of scholarly interest within their specialist areas with very little question 
about its value to the outside world. Grants were awarded by Research Councils on the basis 
of peer review, whereby each research proposal was scrutinised by prominent academics to 
ensure high quality and justifiable expenditure. The basic requirements were timeliness and 
promise but scholarly considerations seemed to prevail over the likelihood of commercial or 
industrial application. The arguments in favour of this system were that basic research in UK 
universities had a high reputation throughout the world. It was often stated that a greater 
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proportion of British scientists achieved Nobel Prizes than was the case in any other country, 
although I personally wonder if that was in fact correct. Indeed, Britain produced a 
continuing stream of important scientific achievements in fields such as molecular biology, 
antibiotics, radio astronomy, nuclear magnetic resonance and semi-conductors, but it was 
often argued that the British capability for outstanding scientific research was not being 
matched by its application in UK industry, either by creating new products or by assisting 
industry to absorb new technology arising from these scientific and engineering 
breakthroughs. This formed the basis of the oft-repeated assertion that Britain is good at 
providing the basic research findings for other high-technology based countries (notably 
Japan) to apply to marketable products which we buy alongside other customers throughout 
the world. 
During the last 15 years the SERC, together with the Department of Trade and Industry 
(DTI), initiated a gradual programme of change directed to the needs of industry. 
Directorates in Polymer Engineering and Marine Technology were set up to enable 
collaboration between universities and industry in these fields, whilst simultaneously training 
research workers to work in the polymer and marine industries. The SERC also set up 
Specially Promoted Programmes (SPPs) for specified areas of importance, e.g. the 
Application of Computers in Mechanical Engineering (ACME) Programme and the Design 
of High-Speed Machinery, which has now become a Link Programme with DTI (see 
Sections 11 and 19). These and similar applications programmes generated so much 
enthusiasm that some academic researchers saw this as an attack on long-term basic research 
which, they claimed, was consequently being underfunded. 
Another example of successful co-operation between SERC, DTI and individual industrial 
companies was the Teaching Company Scheme (TCS), which has provided nearly 400 
interactive partnerships between individual industrial companies and universities or 
polytechnics. Each Teaching Company Programme is established to achieve a change in 
operation of the company. Bright young graduates are employed, usually for three years, to 
work on specific projects that are central to the company's corporate plan. The graduates 
have contracts from the academic institution and their work is supervised jointly by the 
academics and the company's executives. The participating company provides between 25% 
and 75% of the cost, the remainder coming from government funds. 
The aims of the Teaching Company Scheme are: 
1) to raise the level of industrial performance by the effective use of academic resources; 
2) to improve industrial methods by the effective implementation of advanced technology 
 and new ideas; 
3) to develop able graduates for careers in industry; and 
4) to involve academic staff in industry, enhancing research and the relevance of teaching. 
 
4 Technology Transfer 
Apart from agreed collaborative research projects (see Section 10) and special programmes 
such as the Teaching Company Scheme mentioned in Section 3, the problem of technology 
transfer remains important for applying the results of government-sponsored research 
projects to the needs of industry. Very often these results are published in scientific papers 
(which industrialists claim they have little time to read) or at conferences (which they say 
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they have no time to attend). However, few academics realise that by publishing their novel 
findings in this way, they could be making prior disclosure of original ideas which would 
preclude patent protection for inventions relating directly to the results of the research (see 
Section 14). 
The SERC Richards Report of 1975 highlighted the 'pre-development gap' which needed to 
be filled in order to convert a good research finding into a fully-developed and marketable 
product (8). We often talk glibly about our need for more R and D. In my opinion, this 
should be termed R,D and D, with the middle 'D' standing for Design (5). One does not 
develop research — one develops a design based on that research, and so the need for 
Research, Design and Development is becoming more important in the provision of higher 
value-added products with more 'knowledge content'. 
The National Research and Development Corporation (NRDC) was founded by a 
government loan in 1948, mainly to transfer the results of university research (and the 
brainchilds of private inventors) to industrial application. NRDC sought to find suitable 
industrial partners to carry forward good university research ideas, for which it obtained a 
licence to pay for its own costs and to reimburse the university and the inventors for their 
efforts. Largely because it had some outstandingly successful products, mainly in the medical 
field, NRDC was profitable, although it was later absorbed as part of the British Technology 
Group (BTG). 
In forming the BTG, the present government was anxious that BTG should not have the 
exclusive right to exploit inventions arising from SERC-sponsored university researches, but 
that this right should be open to competition from private-venture capital groups. 
Nevertheless, BTG continues to be the world's leading technology transfer organisation in 
licensing new scientific and engineering products to industry on a world-wide basis and in 
providing finance for the development of new technology. It takes the responsibility for 
patent protection of the inventions, as well as for negotiating licence agreements with 
industrial companies. Its net revenue is shared with the inventive source on an agreed 
basis.Since many inventions require further design and development before being licensed to 
industry, BTG sometimes provides finance for this as part of its technology transfer role. In 
cases where a particular technological innovation requires the setting up of a new company, 
BTG can perform a catalytic role in promoting the creation of start-up companies. 
The innovative research that I and my colleagues pursued at Loughborough University of 
Technology, which led to the design and development of the Locstitch pile-fabric machine 
and process (9), was licensed to industry through NRDC. It is also my experience that BTG 
has been a very useful collaborator in several other textile engineering researches undertaken 
at Loughborough University of Technology (10). Furthermore, BTG has obtained patents to 
protect other Loughborough inventions, such as the Speckled Pattern Interferometer, which 
was designed by the Loughborough Optical Engineering Group as a non-invasive technique 
for the measurement of three-dimensional behaviour of structures and objects in their natural 
environment with unparalleled accuracy. 
Applications are diverse — from the investigation of swaying skyscrapers and measurement 
of the stresses and strains in the submerged-leg length of oil-field platforms, through to the 
behaviour of arthritic joints. The Loughborough Speckled Pattern Interferometer is now 
being manufactured and marketed through two BTG licensees — Ealing Electro-Optic plc 
and the Newport Corporation of California. Many other BTG examples of successful 
inventions being transferred into industrial use have arisen nationally in fields such as 
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meteorology, analytical instrumentation, advanced manufacturing technologies, process 
control and safety engineering. 
 
5 Science Parks 
Science Parks (11) originated in the United States, starting at Stanford in the 1950s, and led 
to the creation of Silicon Valley in California. Two famous students, Hewlett and Packard, 
gave great advertising prominence to this success, which by 1980 was said to have employed 
26,000 people working with 80 companies, including the great Hewlett-Packard company, 
primarily in high-technology industry (12). In 1959, the Research Triangle Park in North 
Carolina came into existence by being situated in the triangle formed by three prestigious 
universities, and this now employs 22,000 people on a 5500-acre site. Similarly, Route 128 
became a complex of industrial development, centred round the expertise in electronics at the 
Massachusetts Institute of Technology. 
Apart from the availability of top scientists and technologists, they have often been provided 
with the advantage of reasonably cheap land by being situated in states suffering from 
unemployment and a depressed economy; for instance, the North Carolina Research Triangle 
(which I am familiar with at first hand) is in an area that suffers from the effects of the 
declining tobacco industry, and therefore state taxes have been lowered to attract new 
industries. The resident companies have also benefited from the availability of venture 
capital on favourable terms. Although these are some of the notable successes, it is true that 
several Science Parks in the United States, including some associated with major universities, 
have failed. 
The Science Park concept found its way to Europe some 20 years later and Britain became 
one of the main areas for such ventures. The best known is probably that at Cambridge, 
which was started in 1969 when land owned by Trinity College was made available on very 
favourable terms. Today there are some 30 Science Parks in the UK, and these fall into three 
distinct categories (12). 
Firstly, there are the Science Parks that are almost entirely university-led and funded, as in 
the Cambridge case, where the University has established the Science Park using its own or 
borrowed finance and has continued to be responsible for all the development and 
management functions. Later schemes, such as those at Herriot-Watt and Surrey Universities, 
continued in that style. The Surrey Research Park is owned by the University on land 
purchased via a charitable trust from funds which were raised in the 1960s by public 
subscriptions. Therefore, like Cambridge, its land charges were held at a relatively low cost 
with no interest charges. However, the Brunel University Science Park suffered financially 
because the UK Treasury was said to have 'clawed back' 50% from the sale of the first 
ground lease, as this involved government money. 
The second classification of Science Park funding is by joint-venture companies. The joint-
venture company provides a vehicle through which the control and management of future 
development may be co-ordinated. For instance, Aston Science Park was established in 1983 
by Birmingham Technology Limited, a private company whose partners are Aston 
University, Birmingham City Council and Lloyds Bank. Warwick Science Park is similarly 
run by Warwick University in partnership with the Coventry City Council, the West 
Midlands Enterprise Board and Warwickshire County Council. Similar arrangements are 
seen at the Manchester Science Park and at several other university venues. 
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The third method of funding is the co-operative venture strategy, which does not involve any 
separate legal company and is therefore more flexible. Usually, a local authority or 
development agency takes the leading role and provides the major financial input. The 
Technology Centre at Loughborough is a typical example of this, although it is planned that 
the University will have a larger Science Park when the national British Gas Company brings 
its research and development activities onto the Loughborough University Campus; this will 
form the nucleus of a much greater enterprise over the next few years. Other smaller co-
operative ventures are associated with the universities at Bradford, Leeds, Hull, St Andrews, 
Aberystwyth, Durham, Bangor, Kent, Stirling and Swansea. 
Nevertheless, not all Science Parks need to be associated with universities and polytechnics, 
and the Bolton Technology Exchange was opened in 1986 as a joint venture between Bolton 
College of Higher Education, Bolton Metropolitan Borough Council and English Estates. 
English Estates are a very large national developer and manager of industrial and commercial 
property and have been prominent in the development of many Science Parks throughout the 
country, most notably the Listerhills Science Park at Bradford University. 
Generally speaking, the Science Park is a property-based initiative which: 
• has formal operational links with a university or other higher educational institution; 
• is designed to encourage the formation and growth of knowledge-based businesses 
normally resident on-site; and 
• has a management function which is actively engaged in the transfer of technology and 
business skills to the organisations on-site. 
Therefore, Science Parks have two main objectives in that, firstly, they are to encourage 
technology transfer by reducing the time lag between innovation and the production of new 
products; and secondly, they are intended to provide means of encouraging the establishment 
and growth of high technology industry in order to generate wealth and employment in the 
neighbourhood. There is no doubt that, in several instances, these objectives have been 
achieved, but there have been problems. 
A dialogue has to be established between the companies and the universities, and in many 
cases there needs to be considerable interaction with local authorities and financial 
institutions; therefore, a climate of mutual confidence and respect has to be created. 
Unfortunately, in many cases there has been a low level of technological interchange, and 
this has frequently been blamed on the universities. However, industry itself is subject to 
criticism on this front, in that often the UK industrial companies do not respect academic 
values and know little about how to use the talent prevalent in the academic environment. 
Again, if local authorities tend to resent the higher educational institutions in their locality, 
this can generate problems. The successful Science Parks thrive on a high standard of 
buildings situated in a very desirable location. The continued commitment of the university is 
essential so that academics are constantly aware of the Park's existence and are willing to co-
operate in innovative ventures on it. 
Indeed, one of the prime objectives of most Science Parks is that the university itself should 
form new companies based on innovations springing from its research, as was the case with 
Messrs Hewlett and Packard at Stanford. However, even when favourable conditions are 
provided, such as the provision of adequate buildings at advantageous financial rates, they 
are seldom filled with new enterprises, and even when they are, they are sometimes hardly 
associated with high technology. Sometimes the important factor is the general ambience of 
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the location rather than the availability of the adjacent university staff's expertise in science 
and technology. 
Perhaps it is too early to judge the success of British and, indeed, European Science Parks, 
because they have as yet not reproduced the spectacular successes of the early United States 
developments. It is probably a fact of life that, in the present British economic climate, 
venture capitalists are inclined to be less venturesome than their American counterparts in 
that they prefer to invest in existing business expansions and management buy-outs rather 
than in the much riskier world of starting up new businesses. 
Apart from Specially Promoted Programmes, Teaching Company Schemes and Science 
Parks, many other types of university/industry collaboration exist in Britain. Sections 6 to 16 
of this paper have as their principal source of reference a very comprehensive recent report 
by the Department of Trade and Industry and the Council for Industry and Higher Education 
(13). 
 
6 Directly Sponsored Industrial Research and Consultancy 
In directly sponsored industrial research, the company is able to specify its own objectives 
and criteria for success in return for a fee from the university. This is usually for very specific 
projects and consultancy. Sometimes it can be based on the development of a prototype, but 
it is usually associated with product and process testing. The benefits to the company are that 
the university provides the staff and equipment that the smaller companies cannot afford to 
maintain, the company can define the aims and outputs fairly tightly, and there is the 
possibility of a good cross-fertilisation of ideas. 
 
7 Industrial Fellowships or Studentships 
By providing fellowships or studentships, companies (sometimes with government aid) can 
fund research workers on specific research projects of direct interest to them. The company 
may offer in-house facilities, such as workshop and manufacturing expertise, whilst the 
student will have access to the university's libraries, laboratories and computer facilities. As 
will be discussed in Section 14, the property rights of the university workers need to be 
established right at the outset, together with any confidentiality placed upon the outcome of 
the research, bearing in mind that the university would naturally wish to publish the results in 
due course. 
This type of industrial support is suitable for a company wishing to contribute to research by 
the use of its facilities and expertise, but not by major funding. It is useful in instances where 
the research would benefit from the guidance and advice of a senior academic who could act 
as supervisor to the student. The benefits to be obtained are that the company gains access to 
expertise at a reasonable price and contributes to the training of young research workers who 
may eventually be of use to the company in full-time employment. It is a cost-effective way 
for smaller companies to stay abreast of technological developments and government 
agencies may provide part-funding, for instance through the Teaching Company Scheme 
(Section 3) or through SERC CASE Studentships (Section 8). 
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8 CASE Studentships 
The SERC's scheme for Co-operative Awards in Science and Engineering (CASE) involves a 
postgraduate student undertaking a project which is jointly devised and supervised by the 
academic and industrial partners. The student usually presents his or her thesis after 12 
months work for an MSc or, if the project extends for that long, after three years for a PhD. 
Universities are given a quota of CASE awards and the commencement of projects is 
between August and November of each year. The objective is to undertake research on behalf 
of industry, mainly in the university, by using its equipment to work on a project of 
commercial significance to the particular company. 
The student must spend at least three months of a three-year project in industry. SERC 
supports the research with a studentship and pays the university fees for higher degrees. The 
company provides the necessary materials, travel and recurrent costs and can provide a 
bursary to increase the maintenance element of the studentship by a value of about £100 per 
annum. SERC also expects the company to pay the student's out-of-pocket expenses whilst in 
industry and to make a modest contribution in cash and kind to the university to support the 
running costs of the project. 
 
9 Research Clubs 
A research club is an association of companies with one or more universities whose purpose 
is to collaborate in research or to encourage technology transfer. The membership of the club 
usually involves a subscription and the project is specific to a technical area or sector of 
industry of interest to the sponsoring companies. The companies may wish to support or keep 
close to a developing area of research, and members should be able to partake in the 
dissemination of results and the stimulation of new projects within the general subject area. 
This type of research is suitable for projects where a company is prepared to negotiate aims 
and benefits with others who may actually be competitors. A greater range of expertise can, 
therefore, be applied to technical problems, and the cost to individual company members can 
be shared. 
Typical research clubs are those in Protein Engineering at Oxford Polytechnic, Bio-Medical 
Signal Processing Clubs at Imperial College, London, and the newly established Institute of 
Optical Engineering at Loughborough University of Technology. 
 
10 Collaborative Research Projects 
In a collaborative research project a company or group of companies can assist in resourcing 
and defining the project where commercial exploitation of the research work is not directly 
forseeable. Examples are research areas where the theory or principles are not well 
developed. The government (through SERC and/or DTI) will award funds to the university 
workers on the condition that industry also jointly sponsors the research. It is applicable 
where the company does not need to negotiate its own objectives or its rights to the results, 
but is not suitable for near-market research, either because of the numbers of companies 
involved, or because the university would wish to publish the results widely. 
A typical example of a large collaborative research project is the Alvey Programme in 
Information Technology. The benefits are that an individual company can encourage the 
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development of an area of basic research in which it has an interest, without itself committing 
substantial resources, while ensuring that company researchers stay in touch with 
developments in the particular research area. 
 
11 LINK Programmes 
LINK Programmes are intended to accelerate the commercial exploitation of British 
government funded research in areas of science and engineering with particular commercial 
promise. They are supported jointly by the DTI and the SERC. Industry and higher education 
institutions are encouraged to speed exploitation and develop profitable marketing 
approaches by collaboration. A variety of LINK programmes exist, for example: 
• industrial measurement systems 
• molecular electronics 
• advanced semiconductor materials 
• food-processing sciences 
• the design of high-speed machinery. 
The LINK support is usually limited to 50% for projects related to strategic research. 
 
12 Regional Technology Centres 
The Regional Technology Centres (RTCs) were established in Britain by the DTI, the DES 
and the Training Agency, whereby Higher Educational Institutions and local firms 
collaborate to ensure that companies are fully informed about technological developments, 
particularly in local regions. This co-ordinates and encourages the flow of technical 
knowledge between the universities and local businesses. It maintains a database of 
technology transfer opportunities and provides training in the introduction and management 
of technology. The RTC also develops access to national information or new technology 
which may be of particular benefit to local industry. 
 
13 University Directors of Industrial Liaison (UDIL) 
This is a network of industrial liaison officers working in 89 UK universities and its role is to 
promote understanding and collaboration between industry and the universities. Its activities 
are meetings and conferences for members and publications to help industry by providing, 
amongst other things, a directory of industrial liaison officers and the research interests of 
their particular universities. The individual members are able to advise companies on the way 
their universities can help with research, training, consultancy and testing services. 
 
14 Intellectual Property Rights 
For any type of industrial and university research collaboration, the important matter of 
intellectual property rights needs to be anticipated right at the outset of the research project. 
Questions of ownership of rights are easily overlooked before the property to be protected 
exists, and a contract covering their possibility will forestall wrangling when such rights 
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materialise. The ability to protect and exploit any rights arising out of research will depend 
upon the circumstances in which the research takes place. This usually falls into one of the 
following categories: 
1) Where research is carried out by academic staff as part of their customary activities, 
 exploitation is then a matter between the university as an employer and the academic 
 staff as employees; 
2) Where research is carried out with the support of Research Council grants, 
exploitation is then generally the responsibility of the university (see Section 4); 
3) Where the research is carried out with the support of money from bodies other than 
 Research Councils, for example private companies, it is up to the partners to ensure 
that provision for exploitation is made in the relevant contract drawn up at the outset 
of the  research; 
4) Where research is carried out by students or fellows, and therefore not by an 
employee of the university, the student or fellow should be a party to a contract drawn 
up by the university and by the sponsoring body employing the student. 
Academic inventors should be alert to the commercial possibilities of intellectual property 
(see Section 4). Here organisations like the British Technology Group (BTG) and 
Loughborough Consultants Limited (LCL) are very useful in considering the following 
factors: 
1) The initial proposal for research may contain an idea that needs patent protection. 
 Proposals should therefore be discussed at the formative stage with any staff in the 
 university responsible for registration and exploitation of inventions (usually this is 
 done with the agreement of the Head of the Department in which the research is 
 conducted); 
2) All current research activities should be reviewed regularly and systematically, by an 
 evaluator with experience of the appropriate markets, to identify as early as possible 
 any exploitable potential, which could include computer software specifically 
developed for the project; 
3) It is important to keep a note of the time and date at which a member of staff reports 
an invention and claims to be the inventor; and 
4) It is essential not to publish research findings prematurely. There is a need to make 
sure that the property is protected before any publication, as this often results in a 
patent being unobtainable due to the prior disclosure in a publication. 
The potential for exploitation of intellectual property needs to be evaluated for its scientific 
validity, commercial potential, originality, protectability and further development. The 
services of a patent agent may be useful here, but if discussions take place with other third 
parties care should be taken to ensure that such discussions are protected by confidentiality 
agreements. 
Several methods exist for exploiting the property rights: 
1) The university may assign the rights to a third party, as part of a revenue-sharing 
agreement, as is usually the case with the BTG procedure (see Section 4). Provision 
should be made for the return of the rights to the university within a specific time 
period  should the assignee choose not to proceed with the exploitation; 
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2) Licensing a third party to develop, manufacture and distribute the product after a 
patent has been granted is a commonly employed method. Separate licences can be 
granted by the university for different companies, perhaps in different countries, to 
proceed with the exploitation. It may also be possible to grant the licensee the right to 
sub-licence; and 
3) Many universities have established companies in order to exploit a right, usually in 
the  form of manufacturing or selling a product. In 1969, Loughborough University of 
Technology was the first university in the UK to establish a commercial company, 
Loughborough Consultants Limited, on a British university campus. Among its 
activities, LCL is experienced in this type of commercial exploitation. The use of a 
campus-based company may be appropriate when the considerable start-up costs are 
expected to be recovered from successful marketing of the product. 
The exploitation of the invention needs to be followed up with careful records and accounts 
to ensure that timely statements of sales and royalties or licence fees due are received and 
distributed promptly. It is often the case that the industrial company exploiting the research 
needs constant reminders from the university to pay the royalty due to the university, since 
many companies like to keep their hands on any money received for as long as possible. 
Very often the researchers have a better idea of the companies to be identified as possible 
partners than either the university or even the BTG. Therefore, the university staff should be 
willing to assist in identifying companies capable of producing the product efficiently and 
selling and distributing it in the chosen markets. The university should also be willing to help 
the company in the further development, since the research workers will often have the 
intellectual know-how and skills to ensure that the embryo product is successful and that an 
adequate after-sales service can be provided. 
Typical examples of this, drawn from the author's own experience, were the Locstitch pile-
fabric machine and process (9) and the ART (Automatic Rib Transfer) machine for fully 
fashioned garment manufacture (14). The first of these innovations involved the University 
staff workers themselves specifying a market requirement arising from their own 
observations of inadequacies in conventional methods of pile-fabric manufacture. Industry 
showed little interest in the new machine and the novel process, until a working prototype rig 
had been developed via a SERC grant. In the second case, an industrial company (Corah plc) 
specified the market need, and sponsored the design and development of the ART machine 
under the leadership of Professor R Vitols, an inspired designer who saw the commercial 
potential of earlier SERC-sponsored research at the University (15). In both instances, it 
proved necessary for the academic staff teams to be fully involved in the total innovation 
through the stages of invention, research, design and development, right up to the industrial 
prototype stages and even beyond this into the after-sales service stages. 
Sometimes a university will find it advantageous to have a further contract regarding the 
continued co-operation of the university staff beyond the terms of the initial agreement. Such 
follow-up work can be very demanding of university staff time and facilities, and therefore 
the university and its employees would wish to be recompensed for such further work. The 
university should have an officer responsible for overseeing the terms of all licence 
agreements so that good records are kept of income due and received, and prompt 
distribution to those having an interest in the innovation. 
The following points, summarised from publication (13), are the costing and pricing 
implications in dealing with property rights and the pricing of research contracts: 
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• the university should consider the true value of the resulting intellectual property; 
• it should only dispose of its rights to exploit intellectual property in consideration of the 
true value; 
• background intellectual property which is to be used in the research project should be 
added in the costing of the contract, as should the use of know-how; and 
• agreements to reward academic staff for their contributions to a successful exploitation should be 
negotiated according to the individual contributions of the inventors and researchers. 
 
15 Costing and Pricing of Industrially-Sponsored Research  
  Projects 
From Sections 6, 14 and 16, it will be realised that a university needs to ensure that it charges 
a proper price to the commercial customer, in that when it provides such a service there 
should be a true relationship between the cost of the service and the price charged for it. 
Therefore, the true cost must first be identified. The company involved in the contract will 
also be reassured if it is evident that a reasoned approach to the charging of services has been 
taken. Academic staff should be encouraged to take responsibility for costing their own 
projects, and there is a need for a consistent approach to costing across the whole university 
to ensure that all costs are identified. For instance, Loughborough University of Technology 
has prepared an internal booklet entirely devoted to the costing of research projects, and this 
contains much valuable information. 
Inevitably, there will be a proportion of indirect costs which cannot properly be charged to 
any specific project or activity; however, whenever it is administratively convenient to 
identify and apportion the costs of services as direct costs, this should be done in order to 
keep the proportion of indirect costs (and the potential for argument about the definition and 
relevance of overhead charges) to a minimum. The Committee of Vice-Chancellors and 
Principals (CVCP) has published a methodology for costing projects (16) and recommends 
the practice of levying indirect costs on the payroll costs of all the staff engaged directly on 
the project. This approach assumes the following definitions of types of cost: 
 1 Capital Expenditure covering investment in buildings, plant and other major items 
 of equipment. 
 2 Recurrent Expenditure covering all operating costs of the university, which can be 
 divided into: 
a) direct payroll costs for staff engaged specifically for the project and time spent on 
the project by members of the permanent staff; 
b) other direct costs such as those incurred directly on the project, including 
consumables, new equipment and services, and the usage of existing equipment 
and services which can be properly attributed to the project; and 
c) indirect costs (overheads) incurred on goods and services in support of all the 
institution's activities which cannot be readily attributed to any particular project. 
To summarise, it is good practice to have an institutional policy for costing and pricing. The 
university should develop clear rules on who negotiates contracts and prices and how much 
discretion should be permitted. It should keep accounting systems as simple as possible and 
suitably train all staff involved in negotiating, costing and pricing contracts. It should also 
provide regular relevant reports to project managers to allow the careful monitoring of 
income and expenditure. 
 21 
 
16 The Management of Collaborative Research 
Industrial-academic collaboration in universities can bring substantial benefits to both 
partners, but the venture needs to be carefully managed (13) because research is a special 
kind of activity, and academic and industrial culture may have contrasting views on the 
matter. For instance, industry (particularly small companies) does not always appreciate that 
research is unpredictable and that results cannot be delivered to order. Moreover, time-scales 
are long and 'breakthroughs' rarely happen quickly. Research work involves risk and research 
managers have to be prepared to deal with failure. Even when the results are promising, the 
time that will elapse before commercial exploitation might be measured in years rather than 
months. Whilst research is a day-to-day activity at the university, within a company it may 
represent a new departure and a new field of investment. The company should be aware of 
the fairly long time-scales involved and may wish to make a considered assessment of the 
likely implications before becoming involved in sponsored research. 
Contract research demands skilled research workers, trained support staff and, often, 
specialised equipment and materials. The results will usually have to be tested, piloted, 
developed, manufactured and marketed before they will earn any revenue for the company. 
Therefore, all those involved need to understand the co-operative objectives of the company 
and that arrangements for exploitation of the results are clear (see Section 14). The project 
needs to be properly costed, as stated in Section 15, with no hidden assumptions about extra 
resources being found later once everyone is committed to the project. Therefore, the budget 
planning needs to extend sufficiently far enough ahead to provide a stable basis for managing 
projects. In other words, the industry needs to be committed to seeing it through, even if the 
first results are not very promising. 
Therefore, companies should ask themselves at the beginning of the negotiations the 
following key questions, which are abstracted from publication (13): 
• What do we want from this collaboration? 
• How will we measure success? 
• Is the university conversant with the context of the requirement? 
• Do we understand the motivation of the university staff? 
• Can we contribute to their objectives without adding significantly to the costs? 
• Are we restricting their freedom to deliver? 
• How much is the research worth to us and how much would it cost to do it in-house? 
• Do we get any incidental benefits from the association with the university? 
The university should ask itself: 
• Has the problem been correctly defined by the company? 
• What are the company's deadlines and why are they important? 
• Can we deliver to their requirements, on time and within the agreed budget? 
• How much would it cost us and have we included all our indirect costs? 
• What benefits will the university get from the project? 
Careful consideration of these questions, and truthful answers to them, help the partners to 
understand their different points of view. The chances of failure will be reduced if each 
appreciates the other party's priorities and constraints right at the beginning of the research. A 
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successfully managed project creates a climate of confidence for further collaboration. 
Reaching agreement in a written contract and then failing to work successfully together 
makes both parties very reluctant to repeat the experience. 
Before concluding this section, I ought to state my own personal view that a large 
disincentive which handicaps university staff, and discourages them from embarking on 
industrially-sponsored research, is that it does not conveniently lead to traditional learned 
society publication — which is still a primary requirement for academic promotion. 
Often, because of trade secrecy and the possibility of 'disclosure' to competitors in the 
international market, much sponsored research has a confidentiality clause which precludes 
normal publication. Even with SERC/industry collaborative projects, it is sometimes difficult 
to publish because of the need for UK exploitation of inventive ideas which could provide 
the 'competitive edge'. Publication is also discouraged by BTG and other venture capital 
organisations because of possible 'prior disclosure' problems of unpatented information (see 
Section 4); to patent early is often unwise because of the need for expensive international 
protection after one year when the provisional patents expire. 
It is therefore necessary to keep such inventive research findings extremely confidential until 
they approach the exploitation stage, but by then the lead-time on publications could cause 
them to be of reduced relevance because of similar developments elsewhere. This 
discourages publication, and staff undertaking such work often find it difficult to climb the 
academic ladder. Loughborough University of Technology has attempted to overcome this 
problem by taking into account research income for promotion purposes. To publish does not 
merely mean to print on paper — it means to make generally known; where it is known by 
the University that a staff member has contributed to advances in industrial products, 
processes and systems but cannot publish for confidentiality reasons, this should be 
recognised in the consideration of university staff promotions. 
 
17 Research Sponsored by the European Commission (EC) 
An excellent guide to European collaboration in science and technology was published in 
1987 by the Science and Engineering Policies Studies Unit (SEPSU) of the Royal Society 
and the Fellowship of Engineering (17). The EC devotes about 2.5% of its budget to R and 
D, and the various research projects take a number of forms. 
In the shared cost programmes, an official invitation to submit applications (call for 
proposals) is published in the official journal of the European Communities. This 
announcement is often preceded by a call for an expression of interest. There is usually a 
two- to three-month gap between the call for proposals and the deadline for submission of the 
completed proposal form, but a partnership of organisations in at least two member states is 
an essential condition for most projects. The selection process, which includes review by 
independent technical experts, is conducted entirely on the basis of the written proposal. 
The normal maximum EC contribution for industry and other organisations, apart from 
universities, is 50% of the full economic costs, including overheads, within an overall 
ceiling. Universities and similar higher education establishments may receive up to 100% of 
marginal costs, including many overheads subject to an overall ceiling, but excluding the 
time of permanent academic staff. When a university has an industrial partner, the 
contribution from the EC to marginal costs is normally limited to 50%. In such cases, it will 
often be convenient if the university is a subcontractor. 
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A brief technical report is required every six months, and a final report (or an agreed edited 
version that omits commercially sensitive information) must be made available for 
publication. Some typical EC programmes are detailed below: 
1 ESPRIT (European Strategic Programme for Research and Development in Information 
Technology) 
 The aim of ESPRIT is to provide the European Commission's information technology 
industry with basic technologies through collaborative pre-competitive research and 
developments. Projects must involve industrial partners in at least two EC states, and most 
projects include a university and an average of four companies. The fields covered are: 
• micro-electronics and peripheral technology; 
• information processing systems; and 
• applications technologies. 
The original ESPRIT programme was launched in 1983 and proposals for a second round of 
projects (ESPRIT II) closed in June 1988. 
2 BRITE (Basic Research in Industrial Technologies for Europe) 
3 EURAM (European Research on Advanced Materials) 
The latter two programmes aim to make industries more competitive through research in 
industrial technologies and advanced materials. The funding is for collaborative research 
from 1989 to 1992 on: 
• advanced materials technologies; 
• design methodology and assurance of products and processes; 
• applications of manufacturing systems; and 
• technologies for manufacturing processes. 
 
18 EUREKA Conference 
EUREKA stands for the European High Technology Programme sponsored by a conference 
of ministers of European countries and the EC. Britain is represented by the Department of 
Trade and Industry (DTI). The aim is to promote trans-frontier collaboration in Europe on 
industry-led high technology research and development projects. The funding is available for 
projects carried out by companies in two European countries, possibly in collaboration with a 
university. The level of support will depend upon the national scheme. The project should be 
aimed at a widely marketable product, process or service in order to secure a significant high-
technology advance. 
 
19 Industry/University Collaboration in Engineering Design  
  Projects at Loughborough University of Technology 
Apart from the Locstitch and ART machines referred to in Section 14, I and my colleagues in 
the Mechanical Engineering Department at Loughborough University of Technology have 
had many other engineering design-oriented collaborative research projects with industry. 
These include: 
• noise reduction in synthetic fibre machinery (18); 
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• noise reduction in shoe machinery (19); 
• weft-knitting machines (20); 
• synthesised mechanical linkages (21, 22); 
• automatic clothing assembly (23); 
• supersonic jet texturing of yarns (24); 
• unconventional fabric and yarn machines (25); and 
• a computer-controlled machine for artificial ligaments (26). 
These design-based researches were largely supported by SERC, but all involved either 
direct industrial participation or indirect company support in the form of hardware and/or 
technical advice; this was usually significant to the investigation's successful outcomes. Not 
only does such collaboration provide innovatory machines for the UK manufacturing 
industry, but it is also a highly contributory factor in encouraging creativity in the education 
of undergraduate and postgraduate engineers. 
Industrially-based design projects provide an opportunity for students to investigate real-life 
problems and thus develop their design abilities knowing that the solutions are likely to meet 
a timely industrial need (15). Student motivation increases when they become aware that they 
are conducting design exercises which have more than an academic interest (27). 
Furthermore, academic/industrial collaboration enables lectures and case studies to be 
presented in the light of first-hand ongoing experience by the lecturers concerned; they are 
able to highlight the product and process economics and their social implications by 
emphasising that their recent design experience is based on the demands of a real, 
competitive environment. 
In endorsing the Report (28) of the SERC 1983 Lickley Working Party, on which I served as 
a member, the Engineering Board of the SERC has at last recognised the importance of 
research in engineering design by encouraging higher educational institutions to submit 
collaborative grant applications with industry and with the emphasis on design rather than on 
research alone. In 1984, all the engineering committees of the SERC altered their terms of 
reference to include design in their remits. The SERC Specially Promoted Programme in the 
'Design of High-Speed Machinery', which has since become a DTI LINK Collaborative 
Research Programme (see Sections 3 and 11), was launched in 1985 with seven examples 
taken from the many high-speed and automatic machinery researches undertaken by 
colleagues and myself in the Mechanical Engineering Department at Loughborough (10). 
Current examples of such SERC/DTI/industry-sponsored research into the design of high-
speed machines in that Department include: 
• friction spinning (Platt Saco Lowell); 
• mingling nozzles (Rieter Scragg); 
• ultrasonic forming (Metal Box); 
• can manufacture (Metal Box); 
• fast-operating clutches; and 
• piezo-electric high-speed actuators regulating discrete motion controlled drives. 
If British universities are to progress in effective design-oriented research, this needs to be 
directed towards using largely existing knowledge in creating new devices, processes, 
systems, circuits and so on, and will usually require an interdisciplinary teamwork effort. It 
will certainly involve all types of specialists, provided that they are prepared to recognise that 
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the ultimate objectives in the application of their specialist disciplines is superb design. As 
Director of the new Engineering Design Institute at Loughborough, I hope to extend this type 
of research activity across all departments of the university and across a wide range of 
industrial companies. The companies will assist in the joint assessment of design projects, 
particularly in respect of the recognition, identification and specification of industrial needs 
in light of the current economic climate and the rapidly changing levels of today's 
technology. 
Many Loughborough departments have extensive records of design-related research. Most of 
this work is funded jointly by industry and the SERC, with an increasing number attracting 
support from European Community schemes such as BRITE and ESPRIT. The total 1988/89 
external income across the University associated with the design activity exceeded £5 
million. The Engineering Design Institute hopes to further encourage collaborative inter-
departmental design research whereby the experimental programmes would be undertaken in 
the major department, and inter-departmental research teams would be seconded to the EDI 
to ensure an efficient interaction between disparate groups of specialist researchers. The 
work envisaged for this EDI co-ordinating activity covers a wide range of projects relating to 
the design of products and processes for the wealth-making sector, and the development of 
new design methods and advanced design tools. The Institute, in close collaboration with the 
rest of the University's research community, intends to undertake campus-wide design 
research projects which require combinations of advanced knowledge and facilities in areas 
such as robotics, mekatronics, manufacturing systems, electronics, process technology, 
software engineering, structures, transportation systems, human factors, management and 
industrial design. 
In addition to being a catalyst for inter-departmental research, EDI staff have research 
strengths in a number of new fields with a high potential for industrial application. Included 
in these fields is Design by Features, which aims to provide design engineers with a user-
orientated method of defining engineering components and features on computer-based 3D 
modelling packages. The Design by Features approach also provides a tool for storing 
information in a required format for fully-integrated CIM systems. 
A further design research activity being pursued by EDI staff is the linking of 2D and 3D 
computer modellers to knowledge-based systems through transparent user interfaces, thereby 
providing for the design of technologically advanced products, processes and systems. 
There is a great need for fundamental research into the design process itself by an Expert 
Systems approach involving Artificial Intelligence. In the same way that robotics has tended 
to replace tedious human operations in manufacturing processes, so it is true that some of the 
designer's decisions can also be tedious and somewhat repetitive and could perhaps be 
accomplished by computers. To undertake this considerable task will call for the 
interdisciplinary approach mentioned above. A satisfactory outcome could yield great 
benefits and would certainly justify the long-awaited realisation of the need for research in 
engineering design. 
The Engineering Design Institute has recently been encouraged in its intended 
interdisciplinary approach to design by an award of £125,000 from the Wolfson Foundation 
for an extension to its premises to be known as the Wolfson Research Laboratory for 
Engineering Design. This will not only provide welcome additional space for postgraduate 
researchers, but will also provide a computer applications laboratory and extended modelling 
facilities for design-related research projects. 
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The prestigious new Chair, which I have the honour to hold, namely The Fellowship of 
Engineering Chair in the Principles of Engineering Design (which also has financial 
sponsorship by the Institution of Civil Engineers and the Institution of Mechanical 
Engineers), has been newly created with the objective of collaborating with engineering 
departments in developing a common interdisciplinary approach to the teaching of the 
principles of engineering design to all Loughborough engineering undergraduates. Therefore, 
one of the prime objectives of the Engineering Design Institute is to work with staff of other 
departments in the co-ordination and teaching of design to undergraduates. The Fellowship 
of Engineering has since instituted industrial visiting Professorships in the Principles of 
Engineering Design at the Universities of Aberdeen, Durham, Hull and Oxford. 
As one would expect at a University of Technology, Loughborough has always made a 
strong feature of the teaching of design in its engineering undergraduate courses. In the 
machinery design researches mentioned above, the contributions made by students have 
proved invaluable. From the educational viewpoint, their involvement has enabled them to 
become more effective in the recognition of market needs, in innovative activities, and in the 
analysis and optimisation of the real-life solutions to current engineering problems. 
Another example of this is the Teaching Contract, of which I was the founder Director nearly 
10 years ago (29). Initially this had pump-priming support from DTI, but is now entirely 
funded by the collaborating industrial companies. 
Second-year Mechanical Engineering students perform group design studies put forward by 
industry, which are real industrial problems involving constraints of time and money. A more 
recent addition has been project designs that are part of a Total Product Design topic in the 
third academic year, again supported by collaborating companies. Both of these design 
exercises are supervised by company engineers in collaboration with the departmental 
academic staff, and they are also involved in assessment and marking which contributes to 
the degree award. Similar practical design exercises are to be found in the formation of all 
engineers at Loughborough. 
Regarding postgraduate education leading to Masters degrees in engineering design, 
Loughborough was the pioneer in that the Engineering Design Centre was established for this 
specific purpose in 1966, the same year in which the University obtained its charter. 
Unfortunately, British industry generally gave little support to providing full-time British 
students for the MTech course, although many overseas students were attracted to the 
Loughborough Engineering Design Centre. After Loughborough had been doing it for nearly 
20 years, the 1983 report of the SERC Lickley Working Party on Engineering Design (16), 
on which I served as a member, strongly recommended that there should be short courses or 
linked modular courses in specific design topics and that the SERC should seek ways of 
supporting such short courses. 
The Academic Plan to 1990  published by Loughborough University of Technology in 
February 1987 stated that: "The University is committed to establishing an Engineering 
Design Institute (EDI) which should be an independent department within the School of 
Engineering working closely with the other engineering departments and with the 
Department of Design and Technology". The Institute, which has subsumed the existing 
Engineering Design Centre, now has six members of academic staff plus supporting technical 
and secretarial staff and occupies a specially refurbished and re-equipped building within the 
main engineering complex. 
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All of the Institute's enquiries to industry have shown that postgraduate design courses of 
twelve months duration are largely unacceptable for staff already employed in industry, and 
therefore the new MSc course, which commenced in October 1990, is on a modular basis in 
order to be suitable for either full-time or part-time study. There is also the additional 
attraction of offering the individual lecture modules as 'stand alone' short courses for the 
benefit of those who wish to update their knowledge without undertaking either of these 
postgraduate courses. 
The modular  MSc  course in Engineering Design at Loughborough University of 
Technology is based on the premise that design is a total activity involving all the 
engineering and related management disciplines that are necessary to provide an artefact (i.e. 
product, process or system) to meet a market need; it commences with the identification of 
the need and is not complete until the resulting artefact is in use and providing an acceptable 
level of performance. The course content has been carefully structured to show the critical 
importance of effective engineering design to national wealth creation. As well as preparing 
postgraduate designers to be effective managers of the engineering design process, it will 
provide them with a working knowledge of the latest technological aids. It will also stress the 
importance of industrial design and human factors in the provision of marketable products. A 
major design project, undertaken with industrial co-operation, is central to the course. 
 
20 Conclusion 
I hope that this paper has given some indication of the opportunities for State-Industry-
University linkages in research and teaching, particularly as practised in Britain. Of course, 
examples could be found in many British universities, but I have, naturally, drawn from my 
own experience at the Loughborough University of Technology. 
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JOHN BLAKELEY 
 The purpose of this afternoon’s meeting is to open up the discussion wider than just the 
linkages between universities and industry, to include linkages between all research 
institutions and industry. The idea arose in my mind back in February this year when 
the Ministry of Research, Science and Technology organised a one-day get together at 
the Burma Lodge in Wellington to discuss a framework for future science and 
technology policy for New Zealand. One of the things that came up during the 
discussion at that workshop was the need to develop linkages between research 
institutions and industry in New Zealand, and when I knew Professor Wray was going 
to come and speak on a related topic I thought this was a good opportunity to get a 
wider audience to come and discuss this subject. 
 I am now going to call on Dr Walker to expand a bit on what he said in his vote of 
thanks to Professor Wray's lecture, and give us some thoughts from the point of view of 
himself and his Ministry on the issue that we are here to talk about this afternoon. 
 
DR BASIL WALKER 
 Well, what I would like to do is cover much the same territory as Professor Wray, but 
perhaps give a New Zealand perspective to some of the comments he made, and then 
after that lead on into a much more specific discussion of the New Zealand situation. 
 One of the first things that struck me in listening to Professor Wray was the fact that we 
have similarities with Britain, but at the same time significant and important 
differences — so I think you have to look at the British experience in that context. You 
can’t make one-to-one comparisons between one situation and another. Some of the 
similarities are very important. The cultural similarity is important, and that goes 
beyond the fact that we speak the same language. It goes into the wider cultural 
heritage that we still share with Britain to a large degree. I alluded to that before, in a 
sense, in talking about the Number Eight fencing wire mentality in New Zealand, an 
approach which to me is an outgrowth of the very genuine inventive aspect of the 
British culture, particularly in previous centuries. 
 But there are very important differences as well. One of the differences is that New 
Zealanders, despite the passage of time, still have a comparatively young, immature 
economy and society. I think that does make a difference. Britain, in contrast, is a very 
mature society and in some ways it can be argued that many of the problems in Britain 
are indeed the problems of great age — the fact that it has been there for a very long 
time. After a while cultures, I think, develop inertia simply because of the age factor. 
We don’t have that excuse; we haven’t been around long enough, so that is a significant 
difference. 
 Size is another difference – the fact that we are small and isolated compared with 
Britain, which is rather large. We’re talking about a country of 60 million people being 
a small island, that’s large in our terms. We are a country of 3 million people, and 
geographically isolated at that. 
 It also makes a difference in terms of the economic environment. Britain is embedded 
in a larger macro-economy represented, not only by the European community, but in a 
larger sense by the wider European community (which has now become much wider 
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with the breakdown of the Iron Curtain) and also the trans-Atlantic community. New 
Zealand exists in a quite different community — the wider Pacific community — 
which has different markets, different attributes and so on. 
 So I guess the theme from all that is that there are both similarities and differences and 
they need to be looked at very carefully. 
 I would come back again, though, to emphasising the point which I keep tripping over 
myself, which is the extreme importance of culture — looking at why things happen or 
don’t happen. When we compare ourselves, for example, with the Japanese and the 
Germans, the thing you keep tripping over all the time is the difference in culture; the 
difference in approach to things like science and technology, and until we can change 
that culture we are doing no more than addressing the symptoms of some of the 
problems we have. We are not addressing the root causes. Much of what we are doing 
in a policy sense is drifting in a direction of looking at the problems of culture. 
 For all of that (and I suppose it reflects the fact that we live in a very international 
community these days), the differences in focus that Professor Wray talked about in 
Britain are beginning to be developed here as well. You talked about the need to focus 
on manufacturing in the United Kingdom; that has its counterpart in New Zealand. 
Increasingly, in the science area for example, we are beginning to talk about not 
production for its own sake, but added value — processing in manufacturing. So the 
themes are there, and they are there because they both lead to improved exports which, 
particularly for small economies, has to be the key for escaping from the trap we are in 
at the moment. And added value also means, in the end, employment — people. That’s 
why that kind of thing is so important. 
 Professor Wray made some very interesting comments about the way that funding 
structures for science and technology work, and I couldn’t help grinning at some of the 
things he said because they are very true of New Zealand as well. It is true that funding 
structures, particularly government funding structures, tend to be very conservative. 
They tend to lean in the direction of things that are known. The things that are based on 
prior experience seem to undervalue things that are new and risky and hard to evaluate, 
and they tend to be bureaucratic. Those who have had to deal with the Foundation for 
Research, Science and Technology, for example, may say 'well, that’s true in that 
particular case'. You run the perpetual risk of form being more important than 
substance. 
 It is actually quite hard to break out of that particular problem. In the end, the only way 
you can break out of it is to really look behind the systems, behind the structures, at the 
people who are involved, and try to make sure that the people get together and talk 
about science or technology or research in a common framework using a common 
language, so that you get behind the form and begin to get at the substance of what’s 
involved. 
 One of the great challenges we have in dealing with the research system in New 
Zealand right now is that we have spent an enormous amount of time and effort — 
much of it not mine, much of it other people’s — in setting up new structures and new 
systems, and in principle all of those systems and structures are eminently workable; 
they are perfectly capable of producing good results, but they are also capable of being 
totally disastrous and producing bad results. What we have to do now is look beyond 
those structures at the people who are going to fit into them, who are going to operate 
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them, and make sure that, in fact, the system operates sensibly as opposed to simply 
being established.  
 Professor Wray touched on the tension, if you like, between basic strategic and applied 
research, particularly in the context of government funding. In New Zealand the 
government funding system for science and technology is much simpler than it is in the 
United Kingdom. 
 We don’t have the same variety of different programmes and routes, but we do have, if 
you like, three major routes and they have developed in different ways and at different 
speeds. We have, first of all, the traditional route, which is university funding, and that 
is still very much the province of vote education in New Zealand and will always be the 
major source of government funding for research in the university community. 
 In the middle we have what we call the Public Good Science Fund, and that doesn’t 
really have any exact counterpart in Britain. It is different from the Research Council 
funding because it has been aimed at government science institutions rather than the 
universities, which has tended to be the pattern in the United Kingdom. It is true that if 
you look at the Public Good Science Fund and the university funding, there tends to be 
a bias, a deliberate bias, in the direction of basic and strategic research, but that is only 
tenable, only survivable, if in fact there is something there to look at the other end of 
the system — the applied end — where the links with industry need to be developed, 
and that’s probably the key weakness in the New Zealand funding system at the 
moment. To put that in perspective, I won’t argue about how much government money 
goes into university research — you can always buy an argument by talking about 
that— but let me say loosely that it is somewhere in the range of $50 to $100 million 
dollars, and I won’t argue about where it is inside there. The Public Good Science Fund 
probably amounts to about $250 million. The amount of money the government spends 
directly on supporting industry research is $5 million. So we have a huge imbalance in 
the funding at the moment, and certainly one of the things we are trying to address in a 
policy sense is the improvement of that ratio. In doing that, of course, we have (as all 
government departments do) very difficult trade-offs to consider. For example, there is 
a very good argument that we should be putting more money into the so-called Public 
Good Science Fund, more money into basic and strategic science, and that’s quite true 
— we should be. Money supplies aren’t infinite, particularly at the moment. What kind 
of priority do you put on doing that: on tidying up the Public Good Science funding as 
opposed to finding more money to put into industry-linked programmes? 
 That’s the kind of very difficult political trade-off which departments like mine are 
involved in all the time. I think the total picture is important and there is no doubt that 
in New Zealand we are under-selling, we are under-rating the applied industrial 
component of the total research picture. 
 You talked about a range of methods that have been developed in the United Kingdom 
for encouraging not just university/industry links but, if you like, state/industry links in 
research. We need to use that wider context. 
 I think that probably reflects a particular pattern in the United Kingdom, but the same 
subject is of great interest here. The truth is that in New Zealand we have very few 
instruments available which have been put in place to do the kinds of things you talked 
about. I suppose to some extent that’s a reflection that we have come to this as a policy 
problem quite late. The focus has rather unduly, I think, been on government science 
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itself rather than on those links. It is only beginning to be picked up seriously now. I 
was intrigued by your comments about science parks. I would have to say instinctively 
that I felt comfortable with what you said. Science parks have been experimented with 
in New Zealand and I think if you look in detail at what is being done you will find a 
similar pattern — superficially perhaps successful, but if you look into them more 
deeply is the success real or is it indeed superficial? That is certainly not a policy that 
we have done anything in particular to promote at this point in time. 
 We are very interested in technology transfer, but there has been a very interesting 
policy debate going on in Wellington, particularly about technology transfer, and the 
debate has ebbed and flowed in quite major tides over a period of time. We went 
through a period in New Zealand when a lot of effort went into technology transfer, 
particularly in the agricultural sector. We had very major extension services mounted 
through our Ministry of Agriculture and Fisheries. I think that particular tide has ebbed 
quite substantially, partly because of the economic environment in New Zealand, partly 
because of the general economic environment — the feeling by successive 
Governments that they wanted to withdraw from too paternalistic an involvement in 
transferring technology, from government research institutions to the farming sector in 
that particular instance. 
 The tide is now turning, going back in the other direction, but it is turning in what I 
regard as a much more satisfactory way. We are now looking more broadly at the 
whole scope of not just technology transfer, but the whole issue of technology policy 
— what is the role of government in encouraging, not the transfer of technology itself, 
but the uptake and effective use of technology by the private sector in industry, and that 
is a much wider subject than simply technology transfer. It has to go well beyond the 
confines of farming in the agricultural sector, and we have to look at technology in a 
much wider context than that. 
 The British Technology Group you talked about is an interesting case in point. At 
various times proposals have been made in New Zealand for having something like the 
British Technology Group — a device for, if you like, standing between government, 
science and industry and helping to transfer technology. And it is interesting to note 
that the Australians are currently embarking on a very similar venture with their so-
called ATG scheme. 
 The feeling in New Zealand has been rather against going down that path. Rightly or 
wrongly, I would be interested to get your comment on this later on, because of a very 
strong feeling — and it’s a feeling that I share, I have to say — that we have to be 
careful about putting structures between the people doing the research, the technologist 
and the industries. There is a feeling here that we would be far better to do things that 
will put the researchers in much more direct and interactive contact with the industries 
and the businesses they are trying to serve rather than inventing structures to stand in 
the middle, and that’s the direction in which policy is developing. As I said, I would be 
interested to hear your comments and I guess time will tell whether or not that’s the 
right approach to take. 
 That approach to technology, I suppose, lies behind the approach that has been taken 
with the setting up of the new Crown Research Institutes. Technology transfer is an 
explicit part of the role of the new Crown Research Institutes, but it is a role that is 
built into their basic core business, not something that has been added on. And I think 
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the hope is, from a policy point of view, that it will become an integral part of what 
they do, rather than something they see someone else doing for them because that 
seems to us to be asking for distancing between industry and the researchers 
themselves. 
 You finished by talking about intellectual property rights. That’s an area I would rather 
not talk about. It’s a very difficult area from our point of view. It’s one that from a 
policy point of view we keep approaching in different ways and then backing off 
because it is very difficult. It’s not just a research or science and technology issue; it’s 
an issue that goes well beyond that. It’s an issue that’s becoming of considerable 
concern internationally. Earlier this year I was lucky enough to participate in an OECD 
conference on technology policy that was the outcome of a series of conferences that 
have been held over a period of time, and technology and intellectual property rights 
were a significant subject on the agenda for discussion at that conference. And the 
tension that was evident in the discussion was the tension between the realisation that 
we are increasingly becoming a global family from a technology point of view. The 
notion of there being a New Zealand industry in New Zealand, owned by New 
Zealander’s and doing things for New Zealanders, is becoming increasingly distant 
from the international reality. It’s a very mobile international marketplace and that has 
to be rationalised with the natural desire of different countries to have rather protective 
national perspectives on things like intellectual property rights. 
 It has, interestingly enough, been a particular problem for us in doing what we thought 
would be a very simple thing — renegotiating the science and technology agreement 
we have with the United States. It is a very simple agreement on which we don’t spend 
very much money, but it is quite useful. But it took something like five years to 
renegotiate the agreement, purely because of the differences of perspective over 
intellectual property rights. In the end it was resolved by largely giving way to the way 
the Americans wanted to handle it. In essence, we had more to gain from the agreement 
staying alive than we had to lose from it collapsing. 
 So that’s a very quick reaction to the things you’ve had to say, which I found extremely 
interesting. I think the United Kingdom experiences are very relevant to many of the 
things we are beginning to tackle in New Zealand. As I said, the common cultural 
background is very important because it means you can exchange experiences that 
much more quickly and usefully. At the same time, as I also said, I think we have to be 
careful of the differences between the countries and the environments in which we 
operate. 
 
PROFESSOR WRAY 
 Thank you very much indeed for a very useful contribution. It has amplified a lot of 
things I probably didn’t say very well.  Taking your last point first, about intellectual 
property rights, you mentioned the United States, and it is very right that you should 
because American industrialists are often the keenest and sharpest. They know what 
they are doing, and if you are dealing with any United States company you have got to 
be careful on this question of property rights. 
 I will give you a personal experience of the North Carolina Research Triangle. I have 
many times been Visiting Professor at North Carolina State University at Raleigh. I am 
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well-known there for the supersonic jet texturing of filament yarns. This is the system 
whereby individual multi-filament yarns — nylon, polyester — are put through an air 
jet in such a way that they are overfed. In other words, they are put in at a higher rate 
than you take them away, so as to cause all the individual filaments to convolute into 
buckles or coils. Then they reassemble themselves when they leave the supersonic jet 
so that what you have got is a 'textured' locked-in loop structure. You might think 'Who 
the heck wants that?', but when you think of a nylon yarn as extruded, then wearing a 
garment made from it would be like wearing a polythene bag. If you wear a shirt made 
of such untextured polyester filaments, you might think it looks like silk, but when it’s 
woven or knitted it is almost like wearing a piece of plastic. If you somehow get 
occluded air spaces inside the filament structure so that the body is allowed  to breathe 
through the textured fabric, then you have got something much more like cotton or 
wool. I hate to say this in wool-producing areas! You provide occluded air spaces to 
give thermal insulation — less lustre, better water absorption and improved 
breathability, so that the whole thing is attractive and in one shot you convert man-
made filaments into something that resembles cotton or wool staple yarns, without 
having recourse to the protracted processing sequence of opening, cleaning, carding, 
drawing, combing, drawing again, reducing, spinning, winding — some twelve or 
thirteen processes. You do it in one shot! 
 Air jet texturing is an interesting technique. It was invented in the United States by Du 
Pont, but I did a lot of fundamental research on it. In fact, I did my own PhD on it. 
Since then I have supervised a succession of PhDs on it and I have done some 
collaborative work, largely with a Swiss company because Britain is not in this 
business. But I have also done work based on the Du Pont patents and I have lectured 
to the Du Pont company at Wilmington in Delaware, where it was all invented, and 
they said "You know far more about this process than we do". When I went to the 
North Carolina Research Triangle, another large company asked me would I consult 
with them. Now I had received no payment at all from Du Pont, or anything like that, 
so I was a free agent and in no way had Du Pont revealed anything to me of their 
process, other than what was in the patents — anybody can read and experiment with 
what is described in patents. So all that I had done, I had done unaided. In fact, at the 
beginning of my researches Du Pont tried to obstruct me working in that area. They 
wouldn’t give me an experimental licence; they said it was "Because you are paid to 
teach and we don’t want people to teach our secrets." That’s what they told me when I 
first started researching in the air jet texturing field over thirty years ago. 
 There was no way they would give UMIST, where I was working then, a licence, so I 
had to do it on my own, working from the patents. But I soon got into the situation 
where I knew far more about the process than they did, so I didn’t owe anything to Du 
Pont except that I had started my researches from what I had read and seen in their 
patents. 
 When I was invited to the Research Triangle to consult with another company working 
in the same area they met me with a form and asked me would I sign it. This wasn’t 
just a simple form — it was three pages. I started reading Clause 1 (it was all in 
clauses) and immediately I said "Oh, I can’t sign that Clause 1". They said "Oh, that’s 
not meant for you". So I looked at Clause 2 and said "I’m afraid I can’t sign that 
because that’s Clause 1 again but written in a different way ." "Oh, ignore it," they said. 
Clause 3 — couldn't sign that either. They must have thought "Oh, a tough one we’ve 
got here". So I tore the first page off and you know I went through the whole document 
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and there was nothing I could agree with because it would mean signing away my 
international property rights on anything that I had already invented or was then in my 
mind. Because what it virtually said was "anything you see in our organisation today, if 
you publish anything in future on it, we’ll have your guts for garters". In other words, 
you are a small inventor and we are a big enough company to take you to the courts. 
 Some  American companies are sharp cookies on industrial property rights. I never saw 
the inside of that factory — didn’t want to either. Afterwards somebody I knew in the 
company rang me and said "Thank God for people like you, Gordon. There are other 
professors from Britain who’ve been through and they’ve signed it without reading it". 
They had signed away any rights they had perhaps because they were people who 
wouldn't invent anything anyway. But the point is that they probably don’t read the 
small print, and I am afraid with the Americans on intellectual property they know all 
the small print all right. I was told that Du Pont have eight patent lawyers working 
away and they could crack most patents should they need to. 
 So many companies, particularly large ones, are very keen on intellectual property 
rights. This is why I have always been keen on initial contracts but you can even go 
wrong on this too. We thought we  had a good contract with a local knitting company, 
who mainly made knitwear for the Marks and Spencer stores. They got us to work on 
what turned out to be the Loughborough ART machine — the Loughborough automatic 
rib-transfer process, which is directed to the automation of a knitting process for 
making fully-fashioned garments. What they wanted us to do was to modify their 
existing machines which, like many other British knitters, they had only recently 
bought in quantity from Germany and Italy. No sooner had they bought them than the 
German machine builders came out with something that made the process largely 
automatic, but using a much more expensive machine, double the price; it meant that 
all their new equipment had hardly been run-in and was obsolete in their eyes. So they 
said "Can you invent something that will do what the newer German machines do?" 
We actually invented something that would do even better than the German machine 
did, even though it had to be a bolt-on attachment. We couldn’t do it the same way that 
the Germans had done: (a) because they had good patents; and (b) because we couldn’t 
start from scratch — we had to modify an existing machine. So we invented and 
developed something that was, I think, brilliant for only about ten thousand pounds — 
that was the selling price of the conversion to a fully automatic machine. 
 We knew at the outset that we could do it, so the University entered into the contract 
and it was agreed that such modified machines should eventually be sold to other 
knitting companies and that the University should receive 10 percent of the selling 
price of every machine sold. We put in a statement that it should be based on the 
current selling price because we were aware of inflation going on. We thought it was 
all belted up, bolts and braces, until they starting paying us 10 percent of the cost of the 
parts that they used and not of the price they were selling the machine at. So we said 
"that’s not the selling price". They said "Ah, but we are selling modified machines that 
are converted by using a kit of parts; you provided us with a kit of parts and that's what 
we base the percentage on". 
 We almost had to take it to lawyers but eventually we won. They realised we were 
calling their bluff and their actions might kill the goose that laid the golden eggs, as 
they wanted further work done. It was a  measly attitude to be arguing that it was a kit 
of parts that we had produced and not a machine, but it taught us to beware of such 
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attitudes. That’s why I believe in really good contracts. That’s where the lawyers do 
come in useful and you have to have as good lawyers as they have, and you have to 
have people who know the world of industry. 
 So I think it is important, if you are doing this kind of work with industry, to have a 
good, clearly agreed contract at the outset, in fairness to them as well as to you, and 
you have to be aware of the shortfalls, deficiencies and obstacles that otherwise could 
occur. 
 You mentioned BTG not being a useful model for New Zealand to emulate. The British 
Technology Group, in my opinion, has done fairly well. The idea of BTG is that they 
will exploit private inventions. They don’t need to be university inventions, they can be 
from individuals; they also can be from the research institutions which are not 
universities. They can be from any source and it’s just a case of whether they believe in 
it. They usually take any new proposal to an external referee — just like a refereed 
publication in a way. I’ve been referee for many BTG projects. People have come up 
with an idea that is something near to my field — for instance automatic ways of 
making umbrellas, a patent that was devoted to unusual ways of making an umbrella.  
Although I knew very little about making umbrellas before, I was soon in a position to 
offer useful advice. 
 Anyhow, the point is BTG take up external advise. Once they’ve agreed that they have 
got useful advice and they can go ahead, then of course they’ll talk about taking out 
patent protection and they’ll take patent protection through the whole world if 
necessary. They ask your advice as inventors, very often whether you think it’s 
worthwhile patenting outside Japan and Europe and America; is there any need to 
patent in Scandanavia, for instance, or in Australia and New Zealand, and so on. You 
have got to give your opinion on where they should patent because it costs such a lot of 
money to patent worldwide. The original provisional patent costs so little, but once 12 
months has gone by and you have got to take international patents and keep renewing 
them, then it can be a very expensive business. So BTG are providing useful venture 
capital in that area and, of course, there may be difficulties with the patents (as there 
has been on one of mine). I’ve got three box files of correspondence on things that have 
been cited in United States patent cases, which even go back to the reign of King James 
the First. It seems there was a man called Blodgett — I think every inventor should be 
called Blodgett — and Blodgett had invented a mechanism using twin sewing needles 
for sewing through and stitching garments together. I wasn’t doing that, but it seemed 
that I had unknowingly used a similar technique for making pile fabrics. I couldn’t 
have done my drawings on my patents more like Blodgett’s had I already seen 
Blodgett’s ancient diagrams. I even chose the six cycles of operations and started at the 
same point. I could have started anywhere, but I inadvertently chose the same point 
Blodgett did. He must have been revolving in his grave laughing at me, you know. And 
then, I beat Blodgett. I finally persuaded the patent people that my invention used a 
similar technique, but had essential differences and had a totally different end-use. By 
the way, to do it I had to tell the people in London (BTG) who had to telex in those 
days, not fax, people in New York, who had to then instruct their lawyers in 
Washington to argue it in the US patents courts. 
 Talk about a 'whispering game', the essential differences could easily be lost you know. 
Yet I was the one who knew the technology and it was going through that 
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communication link — London, New York, Washington to the US patents courts and 
so on. It was so easy for misunderstandings to occur. 
 We weren’t allowed to appear there; a US patent lawyer had to represent us in 
America. I don’t think he put the case properly, but it kept coming backwards and 
forwards to us all costing the BTG money. They had to keep asking for extensions on 
the hearing because it went through so much communication time that it was late when 
it got to the people who mattered. It was already beyond the allowed time when it got 
to me. BTG said "Don’t worry about that Professor Wray, we can pay so many hundred 
pounds to have it extended". So that was all money that was going to come out of any 
proceeds from my invention because that would all be counted against it on the final 
balance sheet. But eventually we got it through and then the opposing lawyer said "Ah, 
but if you interpret Blodgett with the teachings of Belford" — I thought "Who the hell 
is Belford?" That was another B, you know, and the man who was finding it all was a 
man called Bowler, and Belford's old patent had shown some of the things that I had 
indicated that Blodgett hadn’t done. Oh dear!  
 So then I had to fight again over that one and it went on through three box files. I spent 
more time on fighting the patents that I did on inventing and developing the thing in the 
first place and I could have been much more useful in doing new research. So you can 
unwittingly enter this whole world of patents, which can be a jungle. It seemed that 
somebody in America, some patent examiner, was determined that we wouldn’t get a 
US patent even though we had no difficulties in the rest of the world. 
 We eventually did obtain a US patent, but it was weakened considerably by the 
arguments the US examiner had brought up because only in United States patent law 
can you go back as far in time as you want. In British and European patent law you can 
only go back 50 years, and if an earlier patent is not within the last 50 years it cannot be 
cited against you Not so in United States law, and they were quoting British patents — 
that was the interesting thing. Both of them — Blodgett and Bellford — were British 
patents. They were quoted against us and yet their inventions were not doing the same 
thing I was doing; so I had to argue all that. British Technology Group did a service 
because they kept going, they kept me going. I think the University would have 
contracted out of the whole situation if it was likely to cost too much, but BTG had 
enough funds to keep going and they had enough confidence to keep going. 
 They say that only one in eight of their patents — their inventions, the things they take 
up — is successful, but that one success has to pay for the other seven failures. So you 
can’t expect a lot of money out of most inventions taken up by BTG.  But they do 
provide a good service. And I think it is a shame that this British public corporation has 
been privatised, because it is now rumoured that it is going to be bought by the 
Americans. So it means that a lot of British ideas are going to be treated in America, if 
BTG is indeed to become American-owned. Frightening when you think about it. I 
think BTG has done very well — not everybody would agree, but most people used to 
criticise them because they thought they should make a lot more money out of their 
inventions. I think that when you think of the service they gave, they were a very good 
institution and they certainly were a viable corporation. They were a national research 
and development corporation and they regularly showed a profit. They were one of the 
few government corporations that showed a profit. 
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 BTG had been formed from the NRDC and the National Enterprise Board (NEB), and 
they were both 'quangos' doing the publicly funded things that the Thatcher 
government wasn’t so fond of. So they were combined together. The idea was 
eventually to privatise BTG and that has happened. 
 There is only one thing I would say against BTG and it arises from the costly 
international patents system. After all, the British taxpayer funded the research, the 
SERC research that led to the invention. It is when BTG feel that the thing is not likely 
to be taken up widely and then they start getting a bit concerned that something is 
becoming too expensive. They say, "What we’ll do, if you agree, is we’ll drop the 
overseas patents and we’ll just keep the British patents." 
 Well, you see, that’s far cheaper but what does that mean? It means that it stops any 
British firm exploiting it. It doesn’t stop the Japanese or the Germans or even the Irish 
(who are actually very good at applying things) from applying it freely.  It just means 
that the British industries are going to be financially handicapped in any application — 
the people who paid for it in the first place. Interested British companies would be the 
only ones expected to pay a licence fee — and that seems wrong to me. It’s the way the 
costly patent system works, you see. It is cheaper if you just take out a patent in your 
own country. So you are only protecting yourself against the people you should be 
helping. 
 The other thing that I think goes wrong in Britain — and I think it's something which 
may have repercussions here — is when the Treasury decide how the taxpayers monies 
are to be divided for national research programmes. The Treasury have two main arms 
as regards this type of funding: the industry 'vote' and the science 'vote'. The industry 
vote goes through the Department of Trade and Industry (DTI), and the science vote 
goes through the Department of Education and Science (DES). Now, of course, the 
Department of Education and Science has to pay for all education, including primary 
and secondary education as well as everything else — the Science and Engineering 
Research Council and the Medical Research Council and the other research funding 
bodies— that is all part of the science vote. It is a big vote but it goes to education 
generally. 
 The other vote goes to industry, but research engineers in Universities are concerned 
with industry. In a way they are concerned more with industry than they are with 
science in my opinion, but certainly they only get their money through the science vote. 
And the repercussions of this is that one can only get at that industrial vote money if 
one goes along with industry. 
 So you, as an engineering academic, have got to get industry to take you along with 
them in research grant applications to the DTI. We have been taken for a ride very 
often with some industrial companies, where they have used our brains and our 
abilities, and our recent publications and so on, they’ve referred to us profusely in the 
grant application. We know of several  cases where companies have gone so far, and 
then dropped us part way, and we did not know we had been dropped. They had got 
their DTI research money and yet they intended to do the work alone. They’ve used us, 
literally used us, to get that money and then they’ve done it themselves and said "Why 
should we pay the University?" You know? 
 You can be very much the poor relation of industry in going for the DTI's industry 
vote. And yet engineers are in that cleft stick of being between Science and Education 
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(DES) and Trade and Industry (DTI), and we cannot get research through the industrial 
money vote. It’s the same in Europe, even with European Community grants now. You 
can’t get into that European research funding unless you are going along with industry 
(usually with companies outside your own country) and industry again has the main 
say. The company can decide how much you should get, and you can be the poor 
relation. So even EC funding can work very badly against the universities. 
 You may wonder why we bother, but thank goodness some companies are better than 
others and these are well worth working with. But we have had the situation where we 
put a project up to the European Commission and we got a lot of interest in the 
possibility of co-operation on the proposed project from a very large Italian company 
making knitting machines.  They said they would very much like to work with us and 
the whole idea behind the EC funding of research is that people in different member 
states should work together. But a British knitting machinery company came to us and 
said "Look, you have had a lot of co-operation from us; if you work with our Italian 
competitors you have seen the last of us." They’re defunct now, so I am afraid we have 
seen the last of them. The point is we didn’t work with the Italian company because we 
thought it was inadvisable, as the British Company had previously supported a Chair at 
the University. We had always got on quite well with them and yet we could see their 
objection. But it’s the way the EC system works — that we had to work with a direct 
competitor of theirs if we were to undertake the European research. So I’m afraid 
we’ve got problems in Europe that perhaps you don’t have in New Zealand. Perhaps 
there are some pointers, though. I don’t know. 
 
JOHN BLAKELEY 
 It is now my great pleasure to call on Mr Angus Tait to give a viewpoint from industry 
on encouraging better linkages between research institutions and industry. I approached 
the Manufacturers’ Federation and asked if they would nominate a suitable person to 
come along today and give an industry viewpoint, and was delighted to hear that Angus 
Tait was going to come, particularly in view of the fact I know he is very busy — he is 
off overseas on a marketing trip at the weekend — so we are very grateful to him for 
coming, and I have great pleasure in asking Angus Tait to give us a few words. 
 
ANGUS TAIT 
 Well, just to define the angle I am coming from: I see myself as a pragmatic 
technologist operating in the comparatively narrow field of industry, and the things that 
I would say I would inevitably say from that point of view. I have actually taken my 
cue from the broader title of Professor Wray’s. I have included the state because I 
regard the triumvirate of state, industry and universities as all of very consequential 
importance, and perhaps in present circumstances in our country I might regard the 
input of the state or the effect of the state as being dominant in that triumvirate. 
 I should perhaps apologise to Professor Wray for not being at your lecture; I am sorry I 
missed it, but I do have a valuable copy of your notes. As John said, I am a bit 
distracted at the moment. I am away to your homeland over the weekend to sell some 
of the products of our technology, and for that fact I am not going to apologise, hastily 
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adding: we need the money — New Zealand needs the money, my company needs the 
money and I need the money. 
 To the basic theme  state, industry and university linkages, and a quick thumbnail of 
where I see us. Outside of primary produce and agricultural research and activities, the 
university and industry links in New Zealand have been very poor. They have been 
patchy and they have waned variously over the years, but they are still pretty poor. 
 Further justifiable criticism is that the level of research and development within 
industry has traditionally been poor, and that is a further constraint on the links with 
industry, because if there is not much R & D going on there’s not the sort of people in 
industry who would have links with the universities. That I regard (quite properly, I 
think) as the outcome of the sheltered years that our industry enjoyed or, depending on 
your point of view, we as a country suffered from. 
 In the post-war years, the prospective loss of our primary produce markets stimulated 
the government of the day to cry to industry, "Hey we’d better do something about 
this", and the cry was to export for survival. And in that period of time the government 
stood very close to industry, they were very supportive and there was progress as far as 
industry was concerned in what it actually achieved, but it was from a fairly low skill 
base, a fairly low level of technology. In 1984, for better or worse, we got a new 
government who swept away much of the entrenched structures. They proceeded to 
lower the tariff walls, as we well know, and fairly swiftly they took what was best 
described as a neutral stance and said, "Let the market declare; we are not going to get 
involved in all of this", and much of the old industry that had been in place for some 30 
to 40 years at that time, simply melted away. 
 In 1986 there was an interesting incident, an incident which I keep the outcome of on 
my bookshelf because I think it was a significant document. The government of the day 
commissioned a report on science and technology from a group that was chaired by 
David Beattie, who was Governor-General at one stage, and the title of that book was 
The Key to Prosperity. It recommended various supportive measures from governments 
— primarily identifying technology as the prospective driver or the engine of our 
economy, as was quite evident in the emerging countries, particularly emerging Asian 
countries. The government was outraged, in fact they publicly pilloried the document, 
simply because it was contrary to the government dogma of the day and all that this 
Committee said was "technology can be the engine of the economy, but it needs the 
support and encouragement". I think that was a very sad incident because it displayed 
clearly the attitude, the indifference and the ignorance of our political masters of that 
time. 
 By the end of the 1980s, New Zealand was in a pretty bad state. It had been suffering 
the trauma of the violent changes of the preceding six years. We had gone through the 
sharemarket and the property crash and it is not too fanciful to paint a picture that we 
were all affected by the stench of the rotting corpses of the sacred cows that have been 
decapitated in that period of time. We were in deep recession, so it was a pretty 
miserable spectacle by the end of the 1980s. What was left of industry was in a survival 
mode; and a survival mode is not the stuff of enlightened conversation with 
universities. The linkages at that stage didn’t look good. 
 Over the same time frame of about 20 or 30 years, industry/government relations 
fluctuated wildly. They fluctuated in the 70s from warm support from the government 
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of the day to industry, to the indifference of the succeeding government, and that 
indifference was, I believe, born of prejudice and ignorance. 
 In 1989 — and, in fact, to sort of cap that and highlight that state of mind — the 
government of the day actually abolished the office of the Ministry of Industry. 
 And what they were saying, as far as I was concerned when I became aware of it, was 
that industry in this country simply didn’t have a place, we didn’t rate. I felt that was a 
pretty grim compliment for any government to pay — or not to pay — to the little bit of 
industry that we did have. So these linkages simply didn’t exist at that point in time 
between industry and government. 
 So here we are now, a couple of years into the new decade. The holocaust has passed, 
we have buried our dead (and there were quite a few of them), and the survivors are 
counting the cost. In reality it is not all bad, and I am saying that from a sense of fair 
play. We have a depressed economy, but we have a very stable economy. We have very 
low inflation, we have got admirably low interest rates and we have a stable labour 
force structure, and that mix is the stuff of competitive edge in the international trading 
world. Furthermore, there is a new industry emerging and they are far different in 
character and quality from that which was consumed in the holocaust. They are better 
informed, they are better equipped. In my own narrow segment of industry, for 
example, there are three times as many graduates now employed as there were in the 
old industry, poorly informed and inward-looking that it was. 
 The most impressive feature is that there is a recognition that future prosperity lies in 
export. There is also a recognition that that means working to world standards. So 
finally, the myth has, I believe, been put to bed and that myth is the one that has been 
promulgated in New Zealand for a long time — we can’t compete with the Japanese or 
the Taiwanese or we can’t do this and we can’t do that, and of this sad spectacle of a 
little country with people trying but feeling quite inferior with respect to what is being 
done and what is being achieved in the rest of the world.  
 In simple terms, what has emerged (and what I firmly believe) is that if the design is 
right —and that is from concept right through to production — we can make it here and 
we can sell it anywhere. Such is the stuff of competitive edge. I believe that it is well-
demonstrated that this is factually correct, in that there are a number of visible 
successes, but too few, far too few. We need a great deal more to regain the strength 
and the position that we have lost in our economy through the effects of the destruction 
of the old industry. 
 Our government maintains, and I think it is fair to say a little hysterically, that it will all 
now happen: everything is going to come right — the environment is right. They’ve 
done those things which I quite agree with, but they are saying in effect "Hey presto!" 
They’re waving the wand and it’s all going to happen: industry will multiply, jobs will 
be created and, of course, they will be back in power next year. I think all of us in this 
room wish it was so — you mightn’t wish the last bit so much, but we wish it so that all 
would come right. But I think that is a bit simplistic. I think it has been well 
demonstrated in many countries that the creation of new industry, new jobs, is a slow 
process unless stimulus, initiative and encouragement by government is part of the total 
package. But here’s the rub: our government won’t have a bar of it. It is dominated by 
dogma. They display supreme indifference. Their motto is almost "Please don’t confuse 
us with the facts; our mind is made up". 
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 There are other words you could use, words like 'arrogance' — take your pick, there are 
a whole host of words, but they are in power at the moment. But, as ever, I believe the 
electorate will decide. We do, finally, have a democratic form of society and I believe 
that it must follow, as the night the day, that unless things come right we will have 
other masters. But whatever happens — and what I mean by that is whatever masters 
we have — I firmly believe that some government not too far down the track will take 
a more enlightened view, they will stand closer to industry and they will introduce 
much more enlightened policies in respect of industry policy, much more enlightened 
policies in respect of the Government's working relationship with industry. 
 Until that arrives, until we have that changed attitude, I believe that the growth within 
industry — this new growth that we so desperately need — will be slow. It will be slow 
to heal the wounds that we are visibly suffering from, from the days of the holocaust. 
To be fair — and I have a strong sense of fair play in me — there have been useful 
things done and there are useful things being done. 
 The funding for science and technology has been maintained despite the grim financial 
position that we are in as a result of the events of almost the last decade. There is direct 
financial assistance to industry. We are into research and development through the 
Foundation for Research, Science and Technology. It is a small fund, it was mentioned 
as being of the order of five million dollars. We in industry are grateful that it has been 
done. 
 There is a small cynic inside of me, of course, that says, "But hang on a minute, this is 
the government that refutes entirely the concept of picking winners, but what are they 
doing? —they’re picking winners, they are saying ‘That’s a good thing, we’ll give you 
some money’ and they give out the money". I argue that they should lend the money, 
but they give the money. They isolate. I have personal knowledge of this — that 
reasonable sums of money are being given to specific prospects who are, in my 
simplistic view, 'winners', they are identifying or causing to be identified as winners. I 
think it is a great thing and I think it’s a pity that the fund isn’t 50 million dollars. I am 
comforted by the statement from the Beehive that, in principle, some people in the 
Beehive wish it was 50 million dollars as well, but we haven’t got the money, so I think 
it is fair to identify that as being a commendable act. 
 There are some government agencies that are trying hard to improve the lot of industry. 
The old Trade Development Board, or Trade NZ as it is now known, is putting 
considerable effort into pulling industry groups together and instilling some sense of 
direction into industry. That is good stuff and it is to be commended, but it is not 
anything like the level of thrust that is required if we are going to achieve what we so 
desperately need to achieve in terms of our ultimate standards of living.  
 Anyway, what’s this tirade got to do with linkages? I believe it’s simply this: the 
government to industry links are almost nil, distanced by dogma, which is most 
regrettable. 
 University and industry links are in a more healthy state and they are improving. A 
better class of industry is growing around us with more graduates and a greater 
appreciation of the importance and the significance of the working relationship 
between industry and the universities, but we still have a long way to go. It is not 
unreal to liken the relationship between government, industry and the universities as a 
strong three-legged stool. We don’t have such a device. Others do, and they are visible 
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from where we sit down at the bottom end of the world. We look to Asia — there are 
many strong three-legged stools in that part of the world and I believe we as a country, 
as a nation, are the poorer for the non-existence of that three-legged stool. Given a 
government standing closer and a longer leg resulting, then closer links would emerge 
from that. 
 Growing prosperity within industry must secure stronger and more secure university 
links. Prosperity within industry is an essential part of the success of industry; it's kind 
of fundamental, but I believe it is particularly significant in relations with the 
university. A prosperous industry is the sort of industry that has the will, the 
mechanism and the means to stand close to industry and I think that has been well 
established, traditionally established in the old world. I would be personally delighted 
to be in a position in my own company to stand more closely alongside of industry and 
alongside of the university, given the sort of long-term prosperity which I believe we 
can and should achieve. 
 In all of this, I don’t think I am alone in these views. In February of this year the 
Ministry of Research, Science and Technology ran a workshop in which we debated 
research, science and technology policy development. There were 30 to 40 people there 
drawn from industry and universities, some of the state enterprises and from 
government, and from the notes that were subsequently published of that day’s 
discussions I’ll highlight some of the points and issues that were raised at the various 
workshops and I’ll read them straight from the document. 
 Of the issues and various complaints, the first one I note is that there was no shared 
strategic vision between government and the private sector. 
 The second point was that the emphasis of government investment is in science, not 
technology and business development. 
 The third was a lack of good understanding of technology in society, which bears on 
the point that was made about the culture that we so sadly lack in our country. I suspect 
we are not alone in that. An issue that springs from  a common problem in the 
relationship between industry, particularly, and politicians, I believe, is that there is not 
a good understanding of the place of technology — the potential for wealth and energy 
and power that can be derived from a strong technological base. This has been well said 
in the phrase I like the best: that technology is potentially a strong driving engine of 
economies. This has been demonstrated time and time again in the post-war world.  
 Another point highlighted that day was the recognition that technology (exactly as I 
have been saying) is an essential driver of the economy. And the last one of the goals: 
to establish a pro-active partnership between industry and government.  
 I read those out simply, not really in a defensive mode, but to highlight the fact that 
there is a strong body of thought within the thinking people and the decision-making 
people within our country. But some of the things that I have highlighted in what we 
have said so far are not wholly outrageous and they find common ground. So, 
government attitude is the key, not in the spirit of the jibes which I find most distasteful 
from our government. Whenever the subject of government relationship with industry 
is raised, the response from government is in a jibe-like form. They refer to the era of 
the 70s when there was strong government support of industry. They display no interest 
in what’s been achieved in other countries now in respect of properly supportive and 
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properly assisted government activities, but dismiss it out of hand as being entirely 
inappropriate. 
 So, to sum it all up, I am an incurable optimist — I would be dead if that was not so. I 
do firmly believe that it will come right, but not in a mysterious, magical way. We in 
industry have got the wit and we have got the will to play our part. I believe that some 
governments down the track, and not too far down the track, will do the things that 
government has to do to put the thing right. Universities, I am sure, will understand the 
opportunity and seize it, and I believe quite confidently that we will have our three-
legged stool.  
Thank you. 
 
JOHN BLAKELEY 
 Now I saw Professor Wray writing a couple of notes down there. Would you like to 
just briefly comment on those? 
 
PROFESSOR WRAY 
 Thank you very much. I agree with what you said, but I don’t think I’d liken it so much 
to a three-legged structure because I am a mechanisms man and I work in the world of 
linkages. Mechanism is a combination of linkages, and a linkage becomes a structure 
when you remove one degree of freedom so your analogy meant more to me when you 
mentioned the engine, the engine of change. Now the only three-part mechanism I 
know is an engine and it has served people well over the years. We all came here using 
an engine incorporating a slider crank chain. You have a crank, a connecting rod and a 
piston, you see, and really that’s the engine of change. That provides the momentum 
and the power. I don’t know which parts correspond in the analogy I mean obviously 
the university would be the crank because there are enough cranks in universities! 
Perhaps the government could be the connecting rod and certainly industry should be 
the piston. 
 
ANGUS TAIT : But we haven't got a connecting rod. 
 
PROFESSOR WRAY  
 Yes, that what’s you were saying, so it’s not much of an engine is it? There are some 
engines without connecting rods, but at the same time, as a mechanism’s man I see this 
engine of change as very much a linkage — state, industry, university linkages. You 
have commented about the problems with government. I wonder if you in New Zealand 
are in the same position that we are in Britain. How many graduate engineers, 
technologists and scientists are in your Parliament? Not that it always does all that 
much good, because we’ve had a Prime Minister that was a scientist and the university 
science suffered badly under her. I wont mention her name so you won’t guess who I'm 
talking about. That was the reason she was refused an Oxford honorary doctorate. 
Prime Ministers who have been educated at Oxford usually receive an Oxford honorary 
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doctorate, but the Oxford community refused to give her one because they did not 
agree with what she had done to science and education. 
 So does it do any good to have scientists up at the top? On the other hand, I believe 
there are only three engineers in our Parliament in Britain and they are in very lowly 
positions. There was only one engineer near the top and he only served in a minor 
ministerial position in the last government. 
 What sort of people do you get leading you? Do they understand the meaning of 
effective links between universities and industry? I think it’s up to us to get more 
people into Parliament who have been taught the common language of industry co-
operating with academia. Much is wrong with academia as seen in a lot of attitudes, as 
I said before: engineering scientists training their own kind of engineering scientists, 
educating the wrong kind of engineers for industry. I know one thing, that at our 
university at Loughborough there is not one person lecturing in the Mechanical 
Engineering Department who has not been in industry. Not many universities can say 
that, but we always insist that we appoint people with industrial experience, because we 
are a University of Technology and we are educating engineers to serve at the cutting 
edge of industry, we are not making engineering scientists who become "back room 
boys". 
 But even some of these industrially reared engineering academic staff become 
scientists because they are made to toe the line, you know, play the publications game. 
To look respectable and get promoted they become scientists. Don't get me wrong, I am 
not against science — I am a Doctor of Science and I am a Fellow of the Royal 
Society. I am certainly not against science, but at the same time I am all for the 
application of science and that is surely what engineering is all about  
 
ANGUS TAIT 
 We have this problem, of course, with politics as a career — the image of which is not 
being improved in recent times. 
 Perhaps if I make you aware that the National Weekly newspaper conducted a poll 
recently of 500 people or so, and the simple question was "Would you rate the 
following persons in accordance with the images that you see" and it went right 
through the professions — the police force and used car salesmen and politicians — 
and, sad to relate, but published on the front page of this national newspaper was the 
outcome. 
 And the sad aspect was that politicians were second from the bottom, only a little 
higher than used car salesmen, which while we all laugh, is really very sad because 
events of the last decade or 12 to 15 years have created this cynical impression in 
people’s minds that politics is not a particularly reputable profession. And maybe there 
are no admirable and pragmatic engineers there because they have looked at the calibre 
of people that were there and said "I’d rather not be with that lot, thank you". My 
tongue is a little in my cheek, but sometimes when the tongue is in the cheek there is a 
measure of truth about it. 
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UNKNOWN 
 Just to comment on the last point, the one about politicians and so on, I don’t think it’s 
actually particularly important to have scientists and technologists in Parliament as 
politicians. What is important is that you have a group of politicians who are science 
and technology literate and who are sympathetic to why those things are important. 
 There is some disadvantage in having people who are professionally qualified. For 
example, it is well-known that the worst Minister of Education you can possibly have is 
someone who was once a teacher. I mean, they are terrible as Ministers — they think 
they know everything and they won’t take advice. It’s much better to have someone 
who is intelligent, hopefully, but who is aware of their professional deficiencies and is 
therefore willing to listen and take advice on how the portfolio should be run. I would 
say that the present Minister of Science and Technology has probably been more 
effective than any other Minister of Science that I have certainly had any connection 
with, and he is not a scientist. He is intelligent, but he is certainly not a scientist and, 
therefore, he takes advice. 
 The real gap to my mind is not in the Beehive, it’s in the boardrooms of the country. 
We have far too few scientists, technologists and engineers sitting on Boards of 
Directors and at senior management level in companies. If you look at the average 
Board in New Zealand compared with, say, Germany and Japan — and I think Britain 
probably suffers the same problem — but it’s true, you find that there is far too high a 
proportion of accountants and lawyers, and far too few scientists and engineers. I think 
it has to change and it is gradually changing. 
 
PROFESSOR WRAY 
 But then government has got to come in, surely because how long are they going to 
think that we can educate our engineers to take those high responsibilities and still only 
give them three years education. You wouldn’t give a doctor three years education and 
expect him to operate on people; no they give him at least five years of education. Yet 
you are expected to bring in all this extra stuff for the education of the engineer and we 
want more microprocessors, more design, more management, more cultural studies, 
etc, all in an already overcrowded time-table. 
 I was talking to a Professor of Philosophy here. He said "Why don’t you have more 
philosophy and ethics in your engineering course? What do you knock out? Do you 
knock out thermodynamics, stress analysis, mathematics? Could he tell me what to 
knock out and stop these people working, doing nothing except studying all around the 
clock? Engineering students seldom enjoy University life as much as the other students 
do because they are so tied down to examinations and passing in such a wider range of 
subjects. The midnight oil is constantly burnt in the engineers’ bedrooms on the 
Loughborough University of Technology campus. 
 The government ought to be saying, "Well, it takes longer to educate an engineer — the 
Germans take six years, why do we only take three in Britain?" (Four, perhaps, in New 
Zealand?) But it is not long enough to teach all the things that they need to know to 
make good managers. How can they be good managers when they’ve had to have so 
much engineering detail crammed into them? And so who become the managers? Who 
indeed become the best managers in the university? The people who have plenty of 
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time at university — more coffee breaks, lesser lecturing loads — you know, the 
economists and social scientists, the people who can whip up university politics, who 
can really get their share of the university money because they plan it well and they go 
in as a well- orchestrated team into Senate and so on. I’ve seen it, haven't you? 
 The engineering lecturers are too damn busy with the real needs of engineering 
industry and the  underlying advanced technology to know how to match those people, 
and that sort of mentality gets through to our students. They are not trained to be good 
managers and it’s not obtained by giving them more lectures from many of the existing 
management lecturers, because some of the people teaching management at universities 
couldn’t manage anything; they can’t even manage to draft and mark exam papers. You 
know it’s true. And so I am very keen that there should be longer engineering courses 
and we should get all the necessary extra management skills taught within our 
education system so that graduate engineers can manage their own industry and not 
leave it all to the lawyers and accountants. 
 
ANGUS TAIT: But you know it is partly the fault of the engineers themselves. 
 
PROFESSOR WRAY : You are saying that. 
 
ANGUS TAIT 
 I can say that because I am an engineer too, but that’s one reason why engineers aren’t 
too successful when they get into Parliament. You talk about the real world being the 
one that engineers deal with, but in fact there is a bigger real world that you have to 
deal with whether you like it or not, and it is a real world that’s populated by people 
like politicians and lawyers and accountants who don’t understand and aren’t interested 
in things like engineering. So if you want to be successful you've got to be prepared to 
dabble in that world, because that’s a real world as well. That, I think, is one of the 
problems that engineers have professionally in that they want other people to come and 
meet them in their world without being prepared to go out and interact with that wider 
world. 
 
PROFESSOR WRAY 
 The engineer is at a disadvantage in that the lawyers and all those other professionals 
you mention, haven’t they had more time to study the wider philosophical qualities 
because that’s mainly all they’ve done? Most have done no real mathematics, they’ve 
done little physics, they’ve done none of the sort of things that the engineer has to face 
up to in his three limited years, so they have been educated to succeed in that more 
glossy wider world, that somewhat superficial world that typifies Britain and 
Australasia. It’s not superficial in Japan and Germany — the real world there is 
producing things that aid the national economy and their people recognise it. To have 
the title "engineer" in front of your name means more than many of the other 
professions and you get paid more. Again, I am afraid its this business of culture. In 
Britain we’ve got the "Yes Minister" culture, the Sir Humphrey culture, the "gin and 
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tonic set" who know "bugger-all" about the real world of engineering that produces the 
wealth that keeps them in jobs. 
 
JOHN BLAKELEY 
 This is probably a good note on which to ask John Manning to say a few words. John is 
here from the Foundation for Research, Science and Technology and he is manager of 
the Technology for Business Growth Programme. I offered John the opportunity to 
speak about his programme, but perhaps also, more broadly, about the Foundation.   
 
JOHN MANNING 
 Well I think most of it has been said. I actually agree with most of what Professor Wray 
has said, especially about the class mentality about different professions and that the 
technologists and engineers are seen as a lower class than the accountants and the 
lawyers — and that’s a very significant cultural problem in British-based colonies, as I 
call them. We are trying to fight battles on a smaller scale than that and our attempts at 
changing the culture of New Zealand industry relate to just trying to convince them that 
it’s worth spending some money on research, regardless of how they think of research 
positions and research staff. We would just like them to spend more on research 
projects and developing new products, and so we provide some assistance to start them 
off in this line. 
 Our programme’s probably a mixture of quite a few of the programmes that you have 
already mentioned that exist in Britain, and is probably most closely related to the 
teaching company idea (and I hope we are going to do it well enough that it succeeds). 
You seem to indicate that the teaching company system in Britain hadn’t succeeded too 
well. We, at the moment, have had quite a few projects and we have products that are 
succeeding in the marketplace. 
 We insist on companies involving themselves with government research institutes, 
including universities, and the reason for that is to ensure that the company has a 
reasonably high standard of research skills to make use of. One of the difficulties we 
face in that area is that there are a lot of companies in New Zealand that don’t trust 
academics. They don’t trust them at all. When we impose or try to impose this 
government/institute partnership on them, they view academics as being unlikely to 
achieve goals on time, unlikely to achieve them within a budget and very likely to 
disclose trade secrets to other people. It only takes one example of this to taint all the 
universities and Crown Research Institutes in the whole of New Zealand — which is 
unfortunate. But that mistrust is, from my experience, a load of rubbish. Having 
worked both in industry and for universities and the DSIR, I can see it from all sides. 
And with a lot of the company managers, that mistrust comes from ignorance and 
nothing else; they don’t have any experience of the university and DSIR systems. 
 On a brighter note in New Zealand, we are still blessed with the most unqualified 
inventors, like those you mentioned from 200 years ago in Britain. I don’t know if 
you’ve still got them in Britain, but we definitely have them in New Zealand. They are 
a very bright spark in New Zealand technology, and a perfect example of this is a 
company in Hamilton called Power Beat International. They have reinvented the lead-
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acid battery and they are probably the first people to make a significant redevelopment 
of that technology since it was first put together — and that invention was done by an 
ex-policeman. I think he got UE, I know he got School C and he might have UE or 
roughly equivalent of A levels and nothing else, and his invention is considered 
valuable enough for Mitsubishi Holdings to have given him $750,000 for an eight 
percent shareholding in his company. So we still have that in our favour and we just 
have to pick them up and run with them now. 
 
JOHN BLAKELEY 
 John, this morning you mentioned two other possibilities that may be coming up for 
TBG to encourage technology transfer and to offer assistance in the development of 
inventions. Are they able to be talked about or are they still very much under wraps? 
 
JOHN MANNING 
 Well, this is the paper that Basil’s Ministry has put forward to extend the Technology 
for Business Growth programme. We are looking for extra funding to allow technology 
transfer directly from the government research institutes, including universities, where 
assistance can be given for the development gap (I think you called it), so that we can 
fund the turning of technology into a prototype and it can then be sold. It’s no good 
trying to sell ideas, I’ve tried to do it personally and on a private basis — go out with 
technological ideas and business plans and try to sell them, but no-one will have a bar 
of it. But if you take a prototype or an example to someone and wave that in front of 
them, then they react and that’s hopefully going to fill that sort of gap. The other arm of 
the scheme is to allow industries to develop products without necessarily having an 
Institute involved with them. This is just a political balancing act, I think. 
 
UNKNOWN 
 Perhaps I could add a bit to that too. Yes I think, as you say, what we have done is 
taken the original TBG programme, which was originally developed by DSIR 
essentially, and we have added extra legs to it to make it a more comprehensive 
approach to looking at the industry end of the whole science and technology picture. 
All the policy development work has been done. It’s all there, it can be put in place, but 
it’s meaningless without some funding, basically, so it’s on hold until we can crack that 
particular part of the problem. There was no prospect in this year’s budget. We were 
hopeful, but maybe things will be different next year. 
 
JOHN BLAKELEY 
 Well, you won’t have all the establishment costs for Crown Research Institutes, 
hopefully, next year. 
 
UNKNOWN : Well, there is an election coming next year too. 
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JOHN BLAKELEY 
 At this point, I propose that we break for coffee for about 10 minutes and then there 
will be an opportunity for general discussion or for anybody who would like to put a 
particular question to any of you people who are on the panel.  
 (John Blakeley resumes) 
 It is my Chairman’s prerogative to kick this off with a subject which I am particularly 
interested in, and which was touched on in Professor Wray's lecture this afternoon: the 
disincentive for academics to be involved in active collaboration with industry because 
it could prevent them from publishing papers if the subject is commercially sensitive; 
and the fact that promotions committees within universities seem to rely very heavily 
on lists of published refereed papers and journals. It doesn’t seem to be all that clear 
whether they take due note of how good the journal is, as long as it’s been published in 
some acceptable journal. 
 In relation to achievements by academic staff members in other areas — in particular, 
with relationships to industry which seem to get no credit whatsoever — I chaired a 
group which was set up by the New Zealand Vice-Chancellors Committee in 1986, as a 
result of representations made to the universities by the New Zealand Manufacturers 
Federation that they needed to look more closely at linkages between universities and 
industry. This working party (which is still in existence now) came up with a report to 
the Vice-Chancellor’s Committee, and one of the things it touched on was this issue of 
promotions policy in universities. We made some recommendations that this should be 
looked at, but the reply was, of course, that every university has to make its own 
decisions about what its policies are in regard to promotion. But it seems this is a real 
problem and it is getting worse, and I would be very interested if anybody else would 
like to air a view on that particular matter, in addition to which the floor is now open 
for any other issues that have been raised in the course of the day. 
 First of all on this promotions one — would anybody like to sound off on that? 
 
UNKNOWN 
 The people who are responsible for making the promotions, presumably they got to that 
level of responsibility through the existing system and therefore they have a vested 
interest in retaining it. 
 
JOHN BLAKELEY 
 I think it is also an issue that  promotions committees are often dominated by people 
who come from the Arts Faculty or pure sciences, and they are trying to fit the criteria 
for promotion of engineers to the same kind of criteria as might be appropriate in a very 
esoteric arts subject. 
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UNKNOWN 
 Mr Chairman, I don’t think it is a matter between arts and engineering, I think it is a 
matter of academic culture, especially around this University — a perception of the 
Cambridge of the South Pacific and the sorts of things that you are talking about and 
what Gordon has been talking about are not valued as being part of that culture. You 
don’t get Brownie points for solving the problems of Angus Tait. It is as simple as that. 
 
PROFESSOR McCALLION 
 I’ve been on the Promotions Committee and I have represented the views of the 
Department to the Promotions Committee on many occasions on whether they take 
publishing in the News of the World or the Sun, or whatever papers now exist, into 
account as compared with I. Mech. E  Proceedings, the Heads of Department are 
quizzed quite closely on what they regard as the value of the papers, so that I think the 
Committee tries to get a fair view on that. I have no hang-ups on that. 
 What I find difficult is that year after year I make the case on design and what is said to 
me year after year, and I go back to the Department with it year after year, is that if 
there was a public statement, if there was something in the public arena that could be 
judged in terms of design in the same way as a piece of research published can be 
judged by the peer group, then there would be something for the Promotions 
Committee to consider. 
 You see, we are not the only ones in this University — Fine Arts, someone who does 
painting or sculpting or something, they are in the same boat. And their painting, if they 
can put on an exhibition of paintings, particularly if it is reviewed in a reputable journal 
and so on — and so what the Vice-Chancellor has said on numerous occasions is: "If 
your people could work out a way in which their design and development-type work 
could be put in the public arena and commented on in this same way, judged in the 
same way, then that could be taken into account." But it isn’t quite so easy as that 
because we don’t do full designs, we just do bits of designs. 
 
JOHN BLAKELEY 
 There’s an even greater problem with consultancy, and that issue was touched on in 
this working party back in 1986 and quite a few people were of the view that you had 
to take your credit either by a fee for the consultancy, or if you were doing the research 
you got your credit through promotion. Now I think, in fact, many good academics are 
also in demand for their consultancy services and I don’t see any reason why being in 
demand as a consultant shouldn’t be a criteria for being promoted. 
 
UNKNOWN 
 One possible thing that may be put into the arena, you know, from the research 
administration point of view — and I represent that from Massey — is that the 
assignment documents on patents and patents being the most refereed publication in the 
world. There is a clause in there that says the University has to give back the dollar 
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and, of course, given administrative greed and all these sorts of things, sometimes this 
doesn’t happen. 
 So what we decided to do was to create a certificate. If it’s endorsed by Council with 
the Council seal on it, it says this person has assigned this invention to the University 
and there is a ceremony planned for later on this year. A luncheon with the University 
Council which essentially parades the inventors, so there is an idea that Council’s 
endorsing the assignment. They know of the assignment anyway and it creates an 
atmosphere where our inventors within the University are being looked at and endorsed 
by Council, and what they do with the certificate doesn’t really worry me, but the fact 
the University is seen to be supporting these types of people, we have formalised. 
 
PROFESSOR McCALLION 
 John, one other point is that we are in a vicious circle at present because it is very 
difficult to attract working engineers to come back into academia, because they are 
likely to have to take a substantial salary drop to move back into the University. 
 If they are persons with ten, fifteen, twenty years experience, but not a significant 
publication list, they cannot get into the University at, say, better than the lower part of 
the Senior Lecturer’s scale, and it tends to perpetuate the University Engineering 
Departments as being staffed by pure academics, which is neither a benefit to the 
students nor the sort of long-term value of those departments to the public. 
 
PROFESSOR WRAY 
 On that last point, I should mention the problem I’ve got in the Engineering Design 
Institute (EDI) of getting new staff. I was given three probational lectureships to start 
up the institute. Now there is no way an engineering design institute can start up with 
pure academics. We could not have been successful if we hadn’t had people who knew 
the real world of engineering and the engineering industry. So I had to find people who 
had been designers and knew what design was all about, as well as being sufficiently 
talented to teach graduates how to design.  
 One probational lecturer was a young man who had worked for a company on robotics 
relating to North Sea oil rigs and based in York. He was persuaded to come back to the 
area having been educated in the Loughborough area previously. To join us he had to 
try to sell his house in York and bring his children and his wife to Loughborough 
schools and uproot himself for a three-year probationary appointment. Just imagine the 
uncertainty of this family movement always hoping his job would be made permanent.  
 Right, the three years is nearly up for him; they are looking critically at his case. Yet, 
partly due to his skill and effort the EDI has moved from zero students to 100 Masters 
students on his course — 100 Master of Science students, 60 from industry, 40 full-
timers — can you imagine it? They’ve all got individual projects from industry and he 
has to supervise these on top of an intensively heavy teaching load. He sits there with 
the students (either individually or in small groups because design is caught as much as 
taught), sits there at the computer graphics terminal with them or at the drawing board 
until really late at night, his wife and family wondering where he is — you know, 
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ringing up: "I’m coming home in a minute dear". That’s it and he is constantly working 
like that, he’s one of the best teachers we’ve got. 
 So the University people are saying "This man has written no publications all the time 
he’s been here". So I have to make the case. I know if I ask the students what he’s 
doing what the answer will be. Tremendous job; we can’t lose him. So the University 
says "Oh well, we’ll give him another year’s probation but he had better produce some 
papers by then". What’s going to happen to beat the system is that when I get back I’m 
going to have to write some papers with him. But I shouldn’t have to — I shouldn’t 
have to do that but I want to see his appointment confirmed.  
 There we have an excellent teacher, one of the people who the new Institute is really 
depending on, and all the University hierarchy is saying is "Where are his 
publications?" If he doesn't publish he will be damned because his probationary 
appointment will not be confirmed. 
 Its easier to publish in other fields. Two economics lecturers came to see me (when I 
was Head of Mechanical Engineering) and they said "You run a sandwich course, how 
many students do you have on it? How many are industry trained? How many this and 
how many that?" I gave them all the statistics, then I found out, when I looked through 
their 'refereed' publications, that they had written three papers based on what I had 
given them. I mean we in the Mechanical Engineering Department didn’t think it was 
worth publishing; they were just number crunching to argue about the value of 
sandwich courses. Then their work was quoted against us by government bodies set up 
to disestablish sandwich courses on the grounds of cost. That is the sort of thing that 
happens.  
 
BASIL WALKER 
 Certainly many of these problems are problems inside the universities themselves, 
aren’t they? I mean they are ones that, in theory, you can fix yourselves? 
 
UNKNOWN 
 Well, they certainly vary from university to university. Certainly at Lincoln they make 
a specific case of taking account of the value of the contribution — whether it had been 
in the form of research papers or in teaching or in community activities. 
 
PROFESSOR WRAY : How do you take into account the teaching? 
 
UNKNOWN  : By assessment. 
 
PROFESSOR WRAY : Who is assessing them — the students? 
 
UNKNOWN : Oh yes, the students. 
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PROFESSOR WRAY 
 You have student assessment? Oh well, that’s something we’ve not been able to bring 
in. The Americans have that. I think we should have it in Britain. 
 
UNKNOWN 
 With the individual contracts you can write a performance agreement between the boss 
and the university academic that says what the boss wants from you. If you agree that 
it’s going to be papers let it be papers, but if it is something else let it be something 
else, so much more sensible from what I can gather. 
 
PROFESSOR WRAY 
 This resistance against asking students to assess teachers is usually by the those 
individuals everyone knows are bad teachers. They know they stand to suffer by it, 
because it gives the students the chance to say publicly what they have said privately to 
me as Head of Department. One lecturer was supposed to have said to them when they 
asked a question in first year: "If you ask a question like that you shouldn’t be at 
university". Well, what sort of an attitude is that? Are we seeking after knowledge or 
not? He puts them down like that, kills their motivation. Yet that person is dead against 
student assessment of his teaching because he is known to be such a bad teacher. He 
advanced to a Senior Lecturer because he performed in the RAT race — Research, 
Administration and Teaching — in that order. Do research and you ascend on high; do 
administration and that will help as well; do teaching and who knows? — anybody can 
teach they say. So we don’t assess teaching I’m afraid. 
 
JOHN BLAKELEY 
 Basil Walker has commented that perhaps this is within the realm of the universities 
themselves to put right, but the problem, as I see it, is that some universities seem to 
have the attitude that if — as was said in a lecture —with the cultural thing, that if 
you’re doing work of real application, well that’s not really sound academic work and 
therefore it doesn’t belong in the university. Now that attitude is quite prevalent in 
English-speaking countries. 
 
UNKNOWN 
 A similar thing is occurring to some extent through the FRST funding, from the Public 
Good funding, where the academic, pure research is favoured over the applied research. 
 Within a background of industrial CRI we were frantically writing bids that were not to 
look applied, that had to look not useful, because we just kept burning our fingers as 
soon as it was applied. So you’ve got this gap, but the gap actually has two forms: one 
is where you’ve got an electronic idea that you take through to an electronic prototype 
and then you take it through to an electronic thing that gets sold in industry. 
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 There is another type of gap which I think contributes to the lack of uptake of 
agricultural research. A lot of money goes into producing a specification on how to 
grow a plant, a new species or whatever, and that’s all done within a particular institute. 
There is then a quantum step to do the engineering to enable a farmer to deliver on that 
specification. So it’s no longer a lineal process like a small electronic getting bigger 
and bigger and bigger, but agriculture, agriculture, agriculture jump into engineering 
and take the next step to make it work in the fields. And to me that is a step that is not 
well managed through, say, the PGSF funding. If we as, say, agricultural engineers 
apply for funding for that sort of pre-development bit, the engineering bit, they say, 
"Well, you go to the agriculturists and work under subcontract to them". But their job is 
to design a new specification for a plant. So this sort of pre-development gap that's 
missing does take several forms, and I am wondering if you’ve got any comments on 
that. 
 
PROFESSOR WRAY 
 Pre-development gap. I have merely seen it in the design of machinery, the gap 
between research and its industrial application, but you think it happens in developing 
things in a wider context? Is that it?  
 
UNKNOWN 
 The research process that goes down this track, and we’ve actually got to take a 
different technology to add to that to make it useful to the farmer. And to get those two 
technologies together is a very difficult thing to do. 
 
PROFESSOR WRAY 
 Yes it is and how are you going to get credit for that in the publication scheme? 
 
UNKNOWN 
 It's always been in this area that the agricultural engineers simply doing the blue 
overalls bit to help the smart scientist who developed the new plant species. When, in 
fact, it is very sophisticated design engineering required to get a seed exactly 12 mm 
below the surface when you’re driving through tussock this high with rocks this big. 
 
PROFESSOR WRAY 
 Oh yes, I see what you mean now. Well, to me, that’s very much a design problem and 
design never involves only one discipline does it? To me, design is inter-disciplinary 
and that’s the beauty of the Engineering Design Institute and that’s what I find exciting 
about it — the fact that we’re involving the whole University, even the Economics and 
Social Sciences and Human Sciences — because design is an activity that involves 
everybody when you think about it, certainly the human scientists — the man-machine 
interface is crucially important. Your problem of inserting cereal seeds precisely in the 
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ground is a good example. I’ve done some work on that and I know that it involves 
more than one discipline. 
 One thing satisfies me most of all. I’ve managed to get the University going with me on 
the only thing on the campus, in my opinion, that’s really interdisciplinary and that’s 
the Engineering Design Institute. But I’m afraid that even that is under threat because, 
even though it’s the Vice Chancellor’s blue-eyed baby — he really thinks it’s good; he 
knows it’s good, but it’s not yet producing mounds of research papers, you see.  
They’ve got  the national research selectivity assessment coming round again and 
they’re looking for research papers from the Engineering Design Institute because it is 
judged as a separate cost centre externally and on the campus. And so to hide it from 
the scrutiny of the conventional scientific types who externally assess the research 
record for future funding —you know, the sort of people who only recognise 
excellence by numbers of SERC grants, PhD students and refereed publications — he 
feels he has to move it into a Department, and he’s moving it into Mechanical 
Engineering (where I came from). 
 And so people are saying to me, "Gordon, I believe the Engineering Design Institute is 
going back into Mechanical Engineering", and I say "Well, for a start, it never was in 
Mechanical Engineering — I was in Mechanical Engineering, but the Institute wasn’t 
— and it’s not going back into it, it’s going back into it only as a cost centre." But it’s 
very hard to argue that. Just as a cost centre it will be costed under Mechanical 
Engineering, but if on the campus they see it as going into Mechanical Engineering, 
what chance has it of appearing interdisciplinary? At present it’s seen as a separate 
entity and the students that are coming on the course are not only mechanical 
engineers. They aren’t coming to learn mechanical engineering design. They’re 
electrical, chemical and civil engineers, they’re scientists, they’re physicists, they're 
mathematicians, they’re even managers, they’re architects — all sorts of people are 
coming on the course to do engineering design because it’s interdisciplinary. We’re all 
collaborating in this interdisciplinary atmosphere, but as soon as it’s seen to be part of a 
single-discipline Department, that’s the other cross I’m bearing at present. One is the 
earlier mentioned young probationary lecturer syndrome — and trying to get him kept 
at the University; the other one is to stop the Design Institute being seen as part of a 
single Department, because as soon as it’s seen as part of a single discipline it’s no 
longer seen as interdisciplinary. 
 
UNKNOWN :  Is it contributing to industry/science links in its present form? 
 
PROFESSOR WRAY 
 Of course it is, very much so. I mean, every individual design project is set by industry 
and 50 percent of our students are part-timers released on a modular basis from their 
employment. government isn't involved with it so much, except that we’re doing 
government a bit of a favour — we’re taking some people off the unemployment 
register. There’s so many people unemployed in Britain at present that, of the recently 
graduated students in nearly all full-time UK Masters courses, there are many people 
who are there on Training Agency grants because they can’t get a job. So many people 
are out of work in a country that’s losing much of its industry in front of its eyes. Some 
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big companies are closing down, and many small companies are going bankrupt 
because of high interest rates and the recession. Full-time students are coming in on 
Training Agency grants, where the government adds a little bit to the money to the 
money they would otherwise be paying them on the dole. 
 
PROFESSOR McCALLION 
 If I’ve understood the question rightly, it’s quite worrying — the change of structure 
that’s going on. Under the old scheme, if this problem had arisen, MAF would have 
funded it at the Agricultural Engineering  Research Institute at Lincoln. Has that 
linkage gone? 
 
BASIL WALKER 
 It’s a problem that’s specific to the way we’ve structured the funding system in New 
Zealand. I’d have to say, for a start, that to some extent the Foundation, which is the 
funding agency, is between a rock and a hard place because it’s trying to implement a 
funding system in a situation of cross-currents, and it’s trying to chart a course across 
the cross-currents and stay alive and not get into too much trouble. 
 In principle, the Public Good Science Fund can and does fund basic science, strategic 
science and applied research. In fact, if you look at the figures for 1990-91 (which is 
the last year we have complete figures for), roughly 10 percent went into basic science, 
40 percent into strategic science and 40 percent into applied research, so don’t imagine 
for a minute that there’s no applied research funded through the Public Good Science 
Fund. 
 But what we’ve had to contend with up until now has been the dogmatic attitude 
approach adopted by the Treasury on all of this. They have taken the view very 
dogmatically that things are either suitable for funding for the government, in which 
case no one has any possible interest in doing anything with the research, or it should 
be picked up by industry. And there's no middle ground between the two things — it’s 
either one thing or the other. 
 Now of course the truth of the matter is that that’s completely untrue. There’s a huge 
middle ground — grey territory which is neither one thing nor the other. You can call it 
near-commercial, or applied research — I don’t care what you call it, but there is that 
enormous middle ground which is terribly important. 
 Because of the dogmatic attitude adopted by the Treasury, everyone’s had to sort of 
tiptoe round the problem and that, I think, has tempted the Foundation to go in the 
direction of playing safe by only funding things where they thought they weren’t going 
to get into trouble. What we now have to do is bring all of that out of the closet, bring it 
out into the open and much more directly address the problem of the interlinking 
between industry funding and Public Good Science funding of research. And that’s one 
of the things we hope to do over the coming year. 
 
UNKNOWN : Are you optimistic? 
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BASIL WALKER 
 You’ve got to be optimistic in the job I do. Yes, I’m moderately optimistic. I’m 
optimistic in the sense that the current government does have a more pragmatic view of 
these things than did the previous government, so they’re not inclined to be as 
dogmatic as the Treasury in this kind of area. 
 
TERRY HEILER 
 But Treasury don’t scrutinize the results of the Foundation’s allocations, in terms of 
project by project, do they? 
 
BASIL WALKER : No, they don’t. 
 
TERRY HEILER : So is it a matter of removing the fear of the Foundation? 
 
BASIL WALKER : Yes. 
 
JOHN MANNING 
 We have to respond to the Audit Office auditing us and getting us to explain why 
grants were given and why priorities were set on different grants, and that’s why the 
forms that you put in are so important. 
 
BASIL WALKER : Are you talking about TBG grants or FRST allocations? 
 
JOHN MANNING : I’m talking about all of them. 
 
BASIL WALKER : Well, FRST allocations are not grants, they’re purchases of products. 
 
JOHN MANNING : Okay, so TBG is a purchase of products too. 
 
TERRY HEILER : I wouldn’t imagine that would be a problem with audit, would it? 
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JOHN MANNING 
 The audit trail has to be there. There has to be an audit trail to show how the 
Foundation prioritise one application over another. And so what you’ve written in your 
application is critical to that, and this is where it comes down to your assessment. 
You’re saying that it may be seen as being appropriable. Well, a lot of that is in the 
wording of your application. 
 
UNKNOWN 
 The referee’s comments or the feedback coming back from FRST has picked on one or 
two words to reject the bid. They say because of this that somebody else will pay for it. 
 
BASIL WALKER 
 Well, that’s part of the defensive attitude. They shouldn’t be doing that; they should be 
much more confident in what they’re doing. But, as I said, it’s not entirely their fault. I 
think they’re contending with a system where the signals don’t tend to be very clear at 
times. I mean they’re in a situation where I can talk to them and say one thing, and it’s 
quite likely that the Minister will talk to them and say something slightly different, and 
someone from Treasury will talk to them and say something different again — and they 
have to make sense out of all of those slightly conflicting signals.  
 What we have to do, I think, as I said, is drag all of that out of the closet and put it on 
the table much more clearly, so that they can then develop some more confidence in 
doing their own thing. Now there is some risk in that, of course. If you drag things out 
and put them on the table, everyone can see what’s going on. And it is possible, for 
example, that our colleagues in Treasury might really start to take fright and start to dig 
in much more strongly than they have done. 
 They are doing that, for example, with the exercise that we’re currently running on 
long-term science priorities. We have been quite open in that exercise in trying to shift 
the funding system in particular directions. And we had an extraordinary submission 
from the Treasury, extraordinary. (It’ll be published, so people can see it.) And what 
they’ve done is entirely set aside the technical and strategic content of what the Step 
Panel has done, and they’ve focused entirely on the philosophical framework within 
which it’s been done. It’s almost as though they’ve retreated back two or three years 
and they’re talking about appropriability. And this is where I start to tear my hair out. 
 Why on earth is the government starting to impose a strategic framework on science? 
Shouldn’t we just be leaving it to the market to sort it out? Can’t we just work on the 
basis of marginal cost-benefit? All that sort of tripe, and there it is all coming out all 
over again because we’ve sort of triggered them into reacting to what we’re doing. But 
I think we’re at the stage where we just have to tough that out and say "Well look, it’s a 
more complicated problem than that — you can’t just apply a conventional economic 
solution to it". 
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DR RICHARD IBBIT (National Institute for Water and Atmospheric Research) 
 Can I make one point please, in relation to this grey area of government-funded 
research in industry and the Step Panel’s report and one point that they brought out, 
which was that they suggested that in those outputs where private enterprise wasn’t 
being seen to be contributing enough, the Public Good funding should be cut. Now, 
that is going to create some appalling signals to people because we’ve waited for five 
or six years for business to come in to providing some research money, and all that 
anybody has said in those five years is "What an appallingly low percentage, in GDP 
terms, business does contribute". If they don’t start soon, they’ll find that even what 
research is done in their broader interests is just going to evaporate. Now, I’m 
interested in any comment either you’ve got on that particular comment that’s in the 
STEP  report or Professor Wray has on how that will impact on industry. 
 
BASIL WALKER 
 Let me just make a couple of quick comments then I’ll pass the ball. I think the signal 
that was given was meant to be the positive signal, rather than the negative signal. And 
the positive signal was that the government should not get caught in the trap of 
withdrawing funding because the industry is coming to the party. That was actually the 
most important signal that was being given, and it was a point I was going to pick up 
on from Professor Wray’s speech: that we need to emphasise the fact that this should 
be a partnership where the industry is putting money in to deal with the applied and 
short-term end of the spectrum. The government should be prepared to put money in to 
support the strategic and basic end of the spectrum — and that’s the single most 
important message that’s been given. 
 The other point that was made very strongly was that we’re setting priorities on a five-
year horizon, and a very clear signal coming through in the Report is that all we’re 
doing is saying - that’s where we’d like to be in five years time. Having decided that’s 
where we want to be, what we have to do is sit down — and that means the Foundation, 
the government, the industry, the research agencies — and figure out how we’re going 
to get there. And a part of the figuring out process is to look at how the industry can 
better provide its contribution. 
 For example, in the agricultural area, where there is likely to be a cut, I think as a part 
of the whole solution we have to address the problem of why the farming community 
isn’t providing a better contribution in some areas, and what the structural difficulties 
are in overcoming that. Now we know already from what we’ve done what one of the 
structural difficulties is — it’s the Commodity Levies Act and the difficulty that the 
government is having in implementing that. (And we know quite specifically what the 
problem is in that area, actually.) But that’s got to be a part of the solution. 
 We’ve got to get away from the situation of regarding each of these things as separate 
pieces that can be put in different pigeonholes and treated differently. At the end of the 
day it’s a complete picture — you’ve got to look at it holistically. You cannot deal with 
the government funding end of the problem without simultaneously looking at the 
industry end of the problem. 
 Now the real problem we have with the Public Good Science Fund isn’t the level of the 
Public Good Science Fund, it’s the low level of industry funding in research in New 
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Zealand — and I keep coming back to that time and time again as the most 
fundamental problem we’ve got at the moment. 
 
PROFESSOR WRAY 
 But how do you answer what industry’s always said to me when I talk this way about 
industry paying? They say: "Look, Gordon, we already pay. We are the ones who 
provide the money and we’re having such a job keeping solvent at present, our problem 
is are we going to exist in a month’s time? How can we put long-term money into 
universities when we’re already paying our Corporation Tax and we have done for 
umpteen years, for the good years. And now we’re having a bad time." And, of course, 
the government have no money either. How do you answer the industry who comes up 
with that sort of talk, because they regularly do it to me? They’ve said "If you knew the 
problems we have in just keeping alive, just keeping going, never mind advancing — 
how can we put that sort of money in?" That’s what they’ve told me. 
 
JOHN MANNING 
 The answer in New Zealand may be because our major corporations pay very little tax. 
Less than 20 percent of the tax take is from corporations. 
BASIL WALKER 
 It comes back to the culture problem, doesn’t it. If you have industries that are saying 
that, then you really do have a cultural problem with those industries and we have the 
same problem here. In some sectors there isn’t a problem, even though they’ve had 
hard times like everyone else. In other sectors there’s a major problem, and you really 
have to tackle it in a long-term sense. You can’t just go along this year and say "How 
about it?" and hope to solve the problem, you’ve really got to think in a five- to ten-
year time frame. 
 
PROFESSOR WRAY 
 Well you see, the Government’s always believed in what they call the Rothschild 
Principle. Lord Rothschild headed a think-tank in the Edward Heath government. Out 
of it came the Rothschild Report and that was the customer-contractor principle — that 
industry would pay half and government would pay half in future on things like this. 
And, of course, every government — Labour governments as well as Conservative 
governments — have always referred university researchers to the Rothschild findings. 
The Callaghan government, the Wilson government, both of them Labour 
governments, adhered to it as well as the Thatcher Conservative government, and so 
there’s always been this idea of 50 percent industry, 50 percent government funding. 
But usually, the government’s given way when industry says: "We’ll put our 50 percent 
in largely in kind, providing the people and the facilities and so on, if you’ll provide the 
real money" — and they’ve got away with it that way.  
 Unfortunately most people weren’t here to hear my other lectures at the University of 
Canterbury, when, I talked about how we in the Mechanical Engineering Department 
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had started the Loughborough Teaching Contract — not a teaching company, a 
teaching contract based on the principle of the Finniston Report (1980) that we would 
actually do lab work in industry. Our students would go in and tackle real problems in 
industry on the shop floor. 
 Some ten years ago we went down to London to the Department of Trade and Industry 
and the 'Sir Humphrey' of the day said "Go and find 12 disciples." (I thought: I wonder 
who he thinks I am.) We went and got our 12 disciples — big companies, really big 
companies: Ford, Austin-Rover, British Petroleum, Metal Box, British Aerospace, 
GEC, etc. — got them all going down to Whitehall to meet him, and he was surprised 
to meet real industrialists (and they were all top people in industry). One was the Vice-
Chairman of Iveco-Ford, and he became the first chairman of the teaching contract; and 
another was the Chief Engineer of British Petroleum (300 companies). 
 This principal civil servant, said to the assembled engineers from industry, "Well look, 
you’re going to have to pay your way on this. You’re going to have the customer 
contractor principle not just in kind — I want a subscription from you. I want you to 
say you’re going to put your money where your mouth is." 
 And so it was decided that they should each pay a £750 per annum subscription, as well 
as putting in their industrial staff to tutor the students (after the students had 
familiarised themselves with the real industrial problems in the company). They would 
also be paying the expenses of their people coming to Loughborough, tutoring the 
students on the project and all the rest; in other words putting their time and  facilities 
into it. 
 Actually one company, a very famous company, turned Judas Iscariot — you know, the 
disciple that ratted on the situation— and they said, "No, there’s no way we’re going to 
pay. On principle we’re not going to pay. We’re putting our staff effort into this and 
we’re not going to pay the damned extra £750 a year." So industry doesn’t always view 
things the way you’d expect them to. Yet smaller companies paid up —  some small 
companies you’ve probably never heard of had paid their £750 a year and got a lot out 
of it. So sometimes you’ve got to look elsewhere than the big companies. But so many 
of our smaller companies are having a pretty rough time in the present recession. 
 
DAVID BARNARD (Cement & Concrete Assn) 
 We are, shall we say, a successful research association, so I’m interested in this 
question of the government linkages in industry because I think that, in all the changes 
that have taken place with the FRST funding, research associations which were quite an 
effective link between the industry and the government — I think our position has been 
very significantly eroded. I can speak as a Director of the Concrete Research 
Association, which was our former name, and just to confirm some other comments 
that have been made about industry funding and the relationship to the government. As  
government funding reduces, so my industry funding reduces. I, as a director, have a 
grave problem as soon as the government says "No, we’re going to reduce the 
funding", my masters want to reduce the funding.  
 Now I have lived with the situation of presenting different schemes, and I’m interested 
to hear that you are going to revisit this grey area, because we did try for a while and 
there was a period of time where we would put up front that only 20 percent of a 
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project was public good and 80 percent ours (and I know it’s difficult to assess those 
things, but we honestly tried to assess them). Now I can tell you absolutely straight 
from the shoulder: if I hadn’t got the 20 percent government funding that project would 
not have gone ahead — in other words, I could not get my industry supporter to 
proceed — and so there is a real problem in trying to, in fact, get this level of funding. 
 We understand the difficulties that the Foundation is facing, but as a small agency 
we’re also having some difficulty in coming to terms with what we felt the previous 
research association was doing. Our Board was structured with four industry 
representatives, and three from the government, so the government representatives had 
quite a firm audit control over the monies that were being provided to us as an 
association — that scheme of things has gone by the board. 
 As an industry agent we’re quite relaxed about contracting work to universities; in 
other words we in effect become an ‘industry broker’. And whether we do the work 
ourselves (because we’ve only got limited resources), or whether we contract it out to 
universities — all those options were open, but now we’re lost in a vast sea of the 
present government funding system and we’re having difficulty in coming to terms 
with it. 
 Our funding’s been drastically cut. You can tell from the name of our Association — I 
mean, what applied scientist or what pure scientist is going to give money to concrete, 
for goodness sake? And yet, we are working in areas which are five or six times more 
advanced than the existing technology that is out there, that the man in the street thinks 
about. So we’ve got a grave problem. We have difficulties in putting that over in trying 
to make these presentations to the Public Good Research. And I know other people 
have had the same difficulty: you score a lot of As and a lot of Bs and a lot of Cs and 
you get one E and the project goes out the window because one referee doesn’t actually 
understand what you’re going for. 
 But I would emphasise that I think the aspect of research associations, whatever the 
automatic funding arrangements that were made (and they can be adjusted) — at one 
time they were 50/50, then they went to one-part to two-part — at least you were in a 
situation of getting some stability. And it is my experience that once the government 
puts that stability in, the industry will put its money in. The interesting thing is that our 
Association and the cement industry were contributing at a higher level than the 
national average as a research association, but that funding has now dropped. I don’t 
know where we are now; we’re probably below the national average. So what’s 
happened is that those industries that were putting money in are now putting less 
money in — and, really, that’s got to be addressed very quickly; otherwise a few are 
going to fall off the edge, quite frankly. 
 
JOHN MANNING 
 That first example — why are you addressing that solely to government? Surely your 
industry should keep its contribution up to its original level? 
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DAVID BARNARD 
 That’s what I’m telling you. This is the difficulty that as an engineer, an 
engineer/manager in the middle of all this scene, I try to make that as a submission. I 
can’t get them to do that; they won’t do that. If they see the government pulling away, 
they pull away — that’s the problem. 
 
JOHN MANNING : It’s that pre-development gap. 
 
DAVID BARNARD 
 Yes, even if the government, in our case, had not backed down at all we would’ve 
stood a fair chance of holding our industry research investment at that level — but the 
government has backed down. Okay, because of the size of the cake and all the rest of 
it, we have to take our chances, but when that takes place the industry says "Hey, hey, 
hey - we’re not going to fund", and they immediately reduce their level. So we as an 
organisation (admittedly we’re owned by the industry), we as an organisation 
effectively take a double cut, and I know many industries are doing exactly the same 
thing and certainly that’s what’s happened in our industry. 
 And as managers, there’s very little we can do about it because we’re just caught up in 
the cross-currents as has been described. It’s extremely difficult as a small organisation 
to fight against those sorts of situations. 
 
TERRY HEILER 
 It seems to be that those comments are about risk-sharing, and what tends to happen is 
that if you’re in an R&D activity there’s an element of risk involved — technological 
and market downstream — and when people are sharing it everybody’s reasonably 
comfortable, but as soon as one of the partners withdraws and says "I don’t want to 
have as much risk as that, I’ll reduce my input", the risk then automatically flops onto 
someone else and you get the sort of response that you’re talking about. I believe the 
mechanisms that we’ve got for joining up government, industry and R&D providers are 
too limited to recognise the reality of that risk. 
 We’ve done a lot of private contracts with big private corporates here in New Zealand 
in affairs that have been quite risky, and the solution has been for us to take some of the 
risk. The client has become much more amenable to proceed with the project the more 
risk that we’ve taken away from him. And I think it’s reasonable to expect that R&D 
providers actually take risk. I don’t think it’s reasonable that an R&D provider gets 
paid full money for what they do if it’s a risky venture. Why should the risk always 
settle on the hands of the industry or the other party? 
 I think we can look usefully at a new range of relationships that might even be reflected 
in policy and in structures and rules that represent the reality of that, because the 
contractor/customer relationship doesn’t do it. And I don’t believe, in all of it, the R&D 
providers should go in and say government should be doing more or industry should be 
giving more, but don’t put any risk on me — I’m just a scientist or an engineer. Why 
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shouldn’t you take the risk if you’re involved in that affair and, in return, take some of 
the returns if you win? It sharpens your focus a helluva lot, in my view. 
 
BASIL WALKER 
 I think Terry’s absolutely right and it’s reflected in the more strategic approach that 
we’re now promoting, both in our work on priority setting and in the operation of the 
Foundation. What we’re saying, really, is "You can’t run science and technology on the 
basis of an auction; there’s more to it than that. You’ve got to think about the 
relationships you have with your suppliers, with the end-users in the industry, with the 
other players in the research game, and put together a whole strategy which really looks 
at their interests, the kind of resources they have, they capabilities they have, the kind 
of risks they’re running, where they’re wanting to go, where you’re wanting to go, and 
put it together into a total package" — and that’s the approach that is being very 
strongly promoted and is really the answer to many of the problems that are being 
pointed to at the moment. 
 My own view (and this is now a personal view which I know isn’t shared by some of 
my colleagues) is that at the applied research end of the spectrum there is a very strong 
case for actually having a rather explicit partnership between the government as funder 
and private sector funders by saying "Okay, here is an applied research project which is 
valuable to New Zealand. If we leave it to the industry it won’t happen because the 
benefits are too vague, it’s too long-term, there’s too much risk associated with it" and 
so on. 
 So there is an element of public good in that programme. The government will front up 
with about 20 percent of the cost that represents that public good provided that the 
industry fronts up with the other 80 percent, or whatever. Now it seems to me that’s the 
kind of solution we need to start going back to. We’re still talking about the research 
itself; we’re not talking about the kind of institutional funding that we had in the past 
— there’s no going back to that — but we can, I think, talk about a much more explicit 
partnership at that applied research and development edge of the government funding 
of science. 
 
JOHN BLAKELEY 
 I’d now like to bring things to a close, but I invite Professor Wray to have the last 
word, if he’d like. 
 
PROFESSOR WRAY 
 I think I’ve said enough last words, but I’ve found it a very interesting discussion. It’s 
fascinating to find that some of our problems are also your problems. I’m sure we have 
passed a lot of this British ‘culture’ or philosophy onto you and we’re responsible for 
it, but we’re in an economic mess. I think we in Britain are finally starting to see the 
light, though. I think that at long last there’s a recognition that there’s no money for 
anybody if our main wealth creator dies, that is, manufacturing industry (and I mean it 
in the widest term — all engineering and technology that relates to our basic  product 
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making, processes and systems). If that goes to the wall then you can forget all your 
education, your health services; you become a Third World country, in effect. 
 And I think we’ve started to recognise the situation. Even in the Royal Society I find 
many distinguished scientists agreeing with me. My work has been in textile 
machinery, researching, developing and designing new machines that are currently 
working throughout the world — but when I was about to be elected to the Royal 
Society, I heard through the 'grapevine' that at the very last hurdle somebody said "Do 
we really want this knitting man in the Royal Society?" Fortunately for me it seems that 
somebody else spoke up and said "We could do with a few more like him, because he’s 
contributed to the national wealth". After all, that’s how the Royal Society gets it 
money, it’s how the whole blinking country gets it money. And it’s about time 
somebody spoke up to get real engineers into the Royal Society, because they’re still 
talking about the first fellows — they were such great men as Hooke and Boyle — an 
early Secretary was Samuel Pepys — and they’ve had many other greatly distinguished 
scientists since — Isaac Newton, Charles Darwin, Albert Einstein, and many more 
today — but they stopped selecting many engineers after Isambard Kingdom Brunel 
and George Stephenson really. They've elected a few more engineers in recent years, 
but I think it's an attitude that persists within the Royal Society and it typifies a 
problem within our culture. 
 Unfortunately, the British system being what it is, as soon as money got tight at SERC 
last year what did they do? The first thing they cut was the Engineering Design 
Initiative, which they had previously said they believed in — they cut that down 
because 'who really wants that?' The next thing to be chopped was the ACME 
(Application of Computers in Manufacturing Engineering) programme. Why? Because 
they must protect 'big science', astronomy — "We must keep ahead in discovering 
more about Mars and the other planets because it's so important to the national 
economy, isn't it?" — and we must maintain research in particle physics, the massive 
subscription to CERN, and the various SERC physical science labs, they must continue 
as on-going costs. So the things that have to go are the things that really contribute to 
the immediate manufacturing prosperity of the country, which pays for all that big 
science ultimately. 
 So we've certainly not won the battle yet and I've been a 'whistle-blower' for 30-odd 
years on the decline of our manufacturing — other people have as well: Sir Monty 
Finniston and the Trouble-Shooter on BBC TV, the chap who was Chairman of ICI 
(you've probably seen him on your television), Sir John Harvey-Jones. He kindly wrote 
to me about what I'd said in my inaugural lecture and commented, "You  and I seem to 
be whistling the same tune — is there anybody listening?" 
 
JOHN BLAKELEY 
 Well that seems a good note to finish on. I'd like to thank everybody very much for 
coming to both the lecture and to this very interesting discussion this afternoon. As 
you've observed, we have recorded it and the Centre for Advanced Engineering 
proposes to produce a publication resulting from all our efforts today. Thank you very 
much for coming, and I declare the afternoon closed. 
